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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models in 
macroeconomic policy analysis. The first chapter discusses a novel approach (PVAR 
approach) to identify from the VAR a structural model of the economy suitable 
for the 
solution of dynamic programming problems. As well dealing dynamic optimisation 
problems involving a single decision maker, the chapter also shows how to assess 
optimal policy from either the Markov perfect or the cooperative or the Stackelberg 
solutions to VAR dynamic games models in which several decision makers compete 
over the control of the economy. The second chapter compares the empirical 
performances of the PVAR approach against those of the standard identification 
methodology by assessing optimal interest rate rules using US data for the period 1960- 
2003. The empirical results show that feedback rules predicted under the PVAR 
approach are smoother than those calculated under the standard approach and welfare 
losses are considerably overstated by the standard approach, regardless of the 
specification of the objective function. The final chapter proposes an index of the fiscal 
stance based on the comparison of the targeted debt-GDP ratio with the short run 
forecast of the debt-GDP ratio of a VAR model formed from the government budget 
constraint. In contrast to the backward-looking assessments of the literature on fiscal 
sustainability, the new index is entirely forward-looking and can be used to construct 
time series of the fiscal stance for the evaluation of fiscal policy over time. The index is 
computed empirically to assess the fiscal stance of the US, the UK and Germany over 
the last 25 years. 
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Preface 
This thesis collects three papers on the use of VAR models for macroeconomic policy 
analysis. The first paper, entitled Optimal control of vector autoregressive models, 
assesses the use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models for the computation of 
optimal macroeconomic policy rules. I first focus on the problem of identifying from an 
unrestricted VAR model a stochastic dynamic system in which the endogenous state 
vector is conditioned upon an exogenous control vector. I describe an identification 
methodology recently proposed by Wickens (2003) which yields a dynamic system 
where the state vector equations are conditioned upon both current and lagged values of 
the exogenous control variables. This technique is evaluated against the conventional 
identification approach, which conditions changes in the state vector equations only 
upon the lagged value of the control variables. The new approach is compared with the 
standard one to evaluate its implications for both the assessment of optimal feedback 
rules and welfare analysis. In the second part of the paper, I look at the issue of 
identification within the context of VAR models involving more than one decision 
maker. Recent works on the computation of optimal policy rules based on VAR models 
- Sack, (2000), Martin and Salmon (1999), Monti (2003) - focus upon single decision 
makers control problems. However, macroeconomic models are often characterised by 
several decision makers simultaneously competing over the control of the economy. 
Hence, I describe how VAR models can be solved to compute optimal policy rules 
from either the Markov perfect or the cooperative or the Stackelberg solutions to vector 
autoregressive dynamic games models. 
The second paper, entitled Assessing optimal monetary policy through VAR models, 
analyses both theoretically and empirically a new approach - PVAR method - to 
formulate optimal policy based on a quadratic intertemporal welfare function and a 
dynamic constraint extracted from a VAR model of the economy. The paper argues that 
the VAR under control should not be derived simply by replacing the VAR equations 
for the policy instruments by an optimal control rule because this alters the stochastic 
structure of the state vector equations of the VAR and gives a state space representation 
of the dynamic constraint in which state variables can only respond to lagged values of 
the control. Instead, one should first transform the VAR in order to condition the non- 
policy variables on the current value of the policy instruments, then using the resulting 
sub-system as the dynamic constraint, and finally construct the VAR under control by 
combining this sub-system with the resulting optimal policy rule. In this way the 
original stochastic structure of the state vector equations of the VAR is retained. In 
addition, under the PVAR approach the non-policy variables in the dynamic constraint 
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are conditioned upon both current and lagged values of the control, hence giving a 
representation of the macroeconomic framework more suitable for policy analysis. In 
comparing the two approaches, the paper explains the theoretical advantages of the 
PVAR over the standard method and illustrates its empirical outcomes by examining 
the formulation of optimal monetary policy rules using US data for the period 1960- 
2003. I find that feedback rules predicted under the PVAR approach are smoother than 
those calculated under the standard approach and welfare losses are considerably 
overstated by the standard approach, regardless of the specification of the objective 
function. 
The final paper, entitled Measuring the fiscal stance, proposes an index of the fiscal 
stance suitable for practical use in short-term policy making. The index is based on a 
comparison of a target level of the debt-GDP ratio for a given finite horizon with a 
forecast of the debt-GDP ratio based on a VAR formed from the government budget 
constraint. This approach to measuring the fiscal stance is different from the literature 
on fiscal sustainability. We emphasise the importance of having a forward-looking 
measure of the fiscal stance for the immediate future rather than a test for fiscal 
sustainability that is backward-looking, or based just on past behaviour which may not 
be closely related to the current fiscal position. We also describe a bootstrapping 
methodology that can be easily implemented to attach confidence bands to the index in 
order to evaluate the statistical significance of the policy prescriptions arising from the 
empirical computation of the index. We use our methodology to construct a time series 
of the indices of the fiscal stances of the US, the UK and Germany over the last 25 or 
more years. We find that both the US and UK fiscal stances have deteriorated 
considerably since 2000 and Germany's has been steadily deteriorating since 
unification in 1989, and worsened again on joining EMU. Out-of-sample projections of 
the index also show that the fiscal stance is expected to improve in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, while further worsening in Germany. 
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Chapter 1 
Optimal control of vector autoregressive 
models 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models for the compu- 
tation of optimal macroeconomic policy rules. I first focus on the problem of identifying 
from an unrestricted VAR model a stochastic dynamic system in which the endogenous 
state vector is conditioned upon an exogenous control vector. I describe an identifica- 
tion methodology recently proposed by Wickens (2003) which yields a dynamic system 
where the state vector equations are conditioned upon both current and lagged values of 
the exogenous control variables. This technique is evaluated against the conventional iden- 
tification approach, which conditions changes in the state vector equations only upon the 
lagged value of the control variables. In the second part of the paper, I look at the is- 
sue of identification within the context of VAR models involving more than one decision 
maker. Recent works on the computation of optimal policy rules based on VAR models - 
Sack (2000), Martin and Salmon (1999), Monti (2003) - focus upon single decision makers 
control problems. However, macroeconomic models are often characterised by several de- 
cision makers simultaneously competing over the control of the economy. I describe how 
VAR models can be solved to compute optimal policy rules from either the Markov per- 
fect or the cooperative or the Stackelberg solutions to vector autoregressive dynamic games 
models. 
12 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
13 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models have been extensively used in macroeconomic policy 
analysis to assess how the future dynamic of key macroeconomic variables, such as infla- 
tion, output and unemployment, is likely to be affected by either an unanticipated policy 
intervention (policy shock) or a change in the systematic component of the policy (change 
in the policy rule). 
A reduced form VAR model cannot be used as it is to carry out any of these two types 
of policy analysis, since a set of minimum restrictions has to be imposed on the parameters 
of the reduced form system to identify the underlying structural model of the economy. 
Full identification of the structural VAR model is necessary to simultaneously assess policy 
shocks and changes in the policy rule. However, this paper is only interested in the second 
type of policy analysis: the change in the VAR policy rule. In particular, the paper deals 
with the issue of identifying from an unrestricted VAR model a stochastic dynamic linear 
model suitable for the computation and evaluation of macroeconomic policy rules. In this 
case full identification is unnecessary, since it is sufficient to identify a so-called semi- 
structural VAR model, through a partial identification scheme (see, Sack (2000)). 
The standard (partial) identification approach is based upon a block Cholesky de- 
composition of the VAR residuals so that policy changes can affect the state variables only 
with a lag. In practice, this implies that the dynamic constraint faced by policy makers 
corresponds with the state vector equations estimated from the reduced form VAR. These 
equations are then used in isolation from the rest of the VAR to measure feedback rules 
and carry out welfare analysis. The paper describes an alternative identification approach 
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proposed by Michael Wickens in his 2003 lectures on VAR modelling at the IMF. In con- 
trast to the standard methodology, the new Policy VAR (PVAR) identification approach is 
based upon a block Cholesky transformation of the reduced form residuals which yields a 
dynamic system of state variables conditioned upon both current and lagged values of the 
policy instruments, rather than only the lagged values as in the standard approach. The pa- 
per shows that the PVAR approach offers a state space representation of the state vector 
equations which encompasses the representation computed under the standard approach. 
Although it does not overcome the Lucas critique (1976) as it applies to VAR models in the 
analysis of policy changes, the new identification approach does not compound the prob- 
lem by imposing unnecessary timing restrictions - in the state vector equations - on the 
interaction between policy and non-policy variables. 
The application of the PVAR approach is presented in the context of reduced form 
VAR models including instrument variables of a single decision maker, in order to out- 
line the implications of the new methodology for the computation of optimal policy rules 
and welfare analysis. This framework is consistent with conventional macroeconomic pol- 
icy analyses, which are based upon the computation of decision rules from the solution 
to stochastic optimal linear regulator problems within VAR models including the policy 
instruments of a single decision maker, without taking into account other policy makers' 
reaction functions. I argue that this omission is bound to yield both misspecified policy 
rules and misleading welfare measurements, whenever there are several decision makers 
competing over the control of the economy. This is because the certainty equivalence prin- 
ciple, which applies to this type of dynamic optimisation problems, implies that the optimal 
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rule can only minimise the volatility of the deterministic part of the state vector equations, 
leaving unchanged that of the stochastic part. Since the computation of optimal policy rule 
depends upon the deterministic part of the stochastic constraint, the omission of variables 
affecting the deterministic component of the state vector leads to misspecified feedback 
rules and mismeasurement of the social welfare loss. 
The second part of the paper extends then the application of the PVAR identification 
approach to compute optimal policy rules in the presence of more than one decision maker. 
In this case, the solution depends upon the number of policy makers and type of strategic 
interaction among them. I show how optimal policy rules can be computed from VAR 
dynamic game models with either Markov perfect or cooperative or Stackelberg solutions. 
The discussion is articulated in four sections, following this introduction. Section 2 
considers the computation of policy rules under the method of dynamic programming when 
optimisation is carried out with respect to a dynamic linear constraint relating over time 
state variables, policy instruments and uncorrelated stochastic disturbances. In principle, 
the constraint can have two different types of timing structures, as policy actions can affect 
the state vector either instantaneously or with some delay. I show that the choice of the 
constraint affects (i) the timing structure and the coefficients of the optimal policy rule and, 
(ii) the measurement of the welfare outcome arising from the system under control. 
Section 3 discusses the identification problem in the context of reduced form VAR 
models, and compares the standard and the PVAR identification approaches. I show how 
the dynamic constraint obtained from both approaches can be used to compute optimal 
policy rules and discuss the welfare implications of each approach. 
1.2 Linear quadratic dynamic programming 16 
Section 4 extends the computation of optimal policy rules to dynamic optimisation 
problems involving more than one policy maker. The solution to these problems requires, 
first of all, the reduced form VAR model to include equations for objective and instrument 
variables of all decision makers competing over the control of the economy. The identifica- 
tion of the stochastic dynamic constraint then depends upon the type of competition among 
decision makers. The paper considers three alternative solutions. The Nash solution oc- 
curs when a specific objective function is entirely delegated to a single policy maker which 
optimises with respect to its own policy instruments by taking other decision makers' reac- 
tion functions as given. The cooperative solution is obtained when all policy makers pool 
together their policy instruments to minimise a common objective function. Finally, the 
Stackelberg solution is examined to compute optimal feedback rules when decision mak- 
ers compete over the control of the economy as in a leader-followers framework. Section 
5 concludes by summarising the main results and highlights the future potential of this 
research. 
1.2 Linear quadratic dynamic programming 
1.2.1 Computing optimal policy rules 
The computation of an optimal feedback rule involves the solution of an optimisation prob- 
lem in which a decision maker's loss function is minimised with respect to the available 
policy instruments and a dynamic constraint relating intertemporally instruments to objec- 
tive variables. If the decision maker's utility function is approximated with a quadratic 
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form and the intertemporal constraint with a stochastic linear function, the solution to the 
dynamic optimisation problem can be easily computed by employing the method of dy- 
namic programming. ' When solved by this method, optimal linear regulator problems are 
normally referred to as linear quadratic dynamic programming problems, since dynamic 
programming is used to optimise a quadratic return function, subject to a system of sto- 
chastic linear difference equations. ' 
Without loss of generality, the intertemporal quadratic cost function of the policy 
maker can be written as: 
00 
L= Et E ßt+s [(Yt+s-Y)'W (Yt+s-Y)] (l . 1) 
3=o 
where Et denotes mathematical expectations conditioned on time t information, yt+s 
I 
zlt+s ". " zit+s-p Z2t+s """ z2t+s-p 
], 
zl is a vector of endogenous variables, z2 is 
a vector of policy instruments, y is a target vector and W is a symmetric positive semidef- 
finite matrix of policy weights. ' 
The value function V (yt), i. e. the minimum value at time t of the welfare loss under 
the infinite sequence of controls {z2t+s}s° o, is given by 
00 
V (Yt) = min EtE, Qt+s [(Yt+s-Y)'W (Yt+s-Y)]. {z2t+s}s-o 
s=0 
For detailed discussions about the use of dynamic programming in dynamic optimisation problems, see 
Bertsekas (2000) and Chow (1976). For applications of dynamic programming to economic problems, in 
particular to optimal linear regulator problems, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). 
2 The Lagrange technique can also be employed as a method of dynamic optimisation as illustrated in 
section 5.4. For a description of dynamic economics optimisation by the Lagrange method, see Chow (1997), 
and, for comparison of dynamic programming and Lagrange method in the assessment of optimal policy, see 
Chow (1976). 
3 The vector yt+, can include current and lagged values of both state and instrument variables. The rep- 
resentation of equation (1.1) is sufficiently general to eventually include first differences of the objective 
function's arguments by imposing ad hoc identities in the off-diagonal elements of the matrix W. 
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Since L is a quadratic form in yt+8-y, the general structure of the value function can be 
guessed to be a linear combination of a quadratic, a linear and a constant term, which can 
be represented as: 
V (Yt) = YtPYt - 2Yip + d, (1.2) 
where P is a positive semidefinite symmetric matrix of coefficients having the same order 
of W, whereas p and d are vectors of coefficients compatible with yt+s. 
The Bellman (1957) principle can then be applied to write the value function in the 
recursive form 
V (Yt) = min (Yt-Y)'W (Yt-Y) + ßEt [V (Yt+i)] (1.3) {z2t+s}8=o 
and substitution of (1.2) into the value function of equation (1.3) gives the following recur- 
sive Bellman (1957) equation: 
PYt - 2Ytp +d= min (yt-Y)'W (Yt-Y) + ßEt 
[Yt+1PYt+1 
- 2Yt+ip + d] . Y' t 00 {z2t+s}s-o 
(1.4) 
The above dynamic optimisation problem is entirely recursive in the vector yt and 
determination of its solution requires the computation of yt+l from a dynamic system that 
relates yt+l to both the previous period value yt and the policy instrument z2. The con- 
straint can include either Z2t+1 or Z2t, according to whether the control vector affects the 
state vector instantaneously or with a lag. Therefore, the stochastic dynamic linear con- 
straint can be written as either 
Yt+i =a+ Ayt + Bzzt+i + Ut+i (1.5) 
or 
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yt+i =c+ Cyt + Dz2t + vt+l , (1.6) 
where the vectors a and c, and the matrices A, B, C and D includes fixed coefficients, 
while ut and vt are vectors of stochastic terms with Et [ut+i] = Et [vt+i] = 0, Et [ut+lui+l] 
Ut+l and Et [vt+lvt+l] = Vt+l. Moreover, the disturbances in both equations (1.5) 
and (1.6) are uncorrelated with the instrument vector, that is Et [ut+lz'2t+1] =0 and 
Et [vt+iz't] = 0. 
The next two sub-sections describe the computation of optimal feedback rules under 
the two specifications of the dynamic constraint. 
First case: yt+l =a+ Ayt + Bz2t+1 + Ut+l 
The dynamic constraint in equation (1.5) can be employed to take forecasts of yt+i, 
which can then be substituted into the recursive equation (1.4) so that, after taking expec- 
tations, the value function can be written as: 
V (Yt) = 
YtwYt +Q (a + AYt + Bz2t+i)l P (a + Ayt + Bzzt+i) (1.7) 
-2, Q (a + Ayt + Bz2t+i) P+ ßE 
(ut+iPut+i) +/ýd 
Differentiation of V (yt) with respect to the control variable z2t+1 gives the first order 
condition: 
äV (Yt) 
= ßB'Pa + ßB'PAyt + ßB'PBzzt+l - ßB'p. öz2t+l 
Setting the first order condition equal to zero and solving for z2t+1 yields the optimal feed- 
back rule 
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Z2t+i =- (ßB'PB)-i B'[ßß'a-ßp] - (ßB'PB)-i ßB'PAyt, 
which can be written in the compact form: 
Z2t =f+ Fyt_1, (1.8) 
f=- (B'PB)-1 B' (Pa - P) , 
F=- (B'PB)-' B'PA. 
Equation (1.8) shows that under the dynamic constraint (1.5) the optimal feedback 
rule is a linear function relating the current value of the policy instrument to a constant 
term and the previous period value of the state vector. A noticeable feature of the solution 
in equation (1.8) is the absence of stochastic disturbances in the feedback rule. This result 
is known as certainty equivalence principle, which implies that the solution to a stochastic 
discounted linear optimal regulator problem is the same deterministic linear feedback rule 
which would be obtained from the solution to the corresponding deterministic problem. ' 
Computation of the coefficients in the optimal feedback rules requires evaluation of 
the matrix P and the vector p. To this end, after substituting the optimal feedback rule into 
the value function (1.7), the minimum expected welfare cost V (yt) can be written as: 
(Yt-Y)' W (Yt-Y) + 
ytPyt - 2y'p +d= +ß [a + Ayt +B (f + Fyt)]' P [a + Ayt +B (f + Fyt)] 
-2,8 [a + Ayt +B (f + Fyt)]' p+ , QE 
(u'+1Put+1) +, 3d 
After multiplying through and rearranging, the above expression becomes: 
a See Brainard (1967) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). 
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y'Wyt+ßy' (A+BF)P(A+BF)yt+ 
y Py - 2yiP +d 
[_2YWY 
+ 2ßy' (A + BF)' (Pa + PBf - p) + 
+y'Wy + ,ß 
(a + Bf)' P (a + Bf) + 
-2ß (a + Bf)' p+ ßE (u'+1Put+1) +ßd 
Since the term 
(A + BF)' PBf = A'PBf + F'B'PBf 
= A'PBf - A'PB (B'PB)-1 B'PBf = 0, 
the minimum value function becomes: 
y' Wyt + ßy' (A + BF) P (A + BF) yt+ 
-2yt'WY + 2ßyt (A + BF)' (Pa - p) + 'Pyt -2YiP+d= +y'Wy+ß(a+Bf)'P(a+Bf)+ 
(1.9) 
-2ß (a + Bf)' p+ ßE (u'+1Put+i) +ßd 
The matrix P can be calculated by equating the coefficients corresponding to the quadratic 
terms on both sides of equation (1.9) as: 
P= W+ßA'PA+2ßA'PBF+ßF'B'PBF. 
Substitution of F=- (B'PB)-' B'PA into the above gives 
P= W+ßA'PA-ßA'PB (B'PB)-1 B'PA, (1.10) 
which is the algebraic matrix Riccati equation for P. Equation (1.10) is highly nonlinear 
and can be computed numerically by writing: 
Pt+j = W+ßA'PtA-ßA'PtB (B'PtB)-' B'PtA, 
setting Pt-- 0 as initial value and then solving for Pt+l. The process is iterated until 
convergence to the stable value Pt= Pt+l = P. 
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The vector p can be calculated by equating the coefficients corresponding to the 
linear terms on both sides of equation (1.9), that is: 
2p =-2Wy+2ß(A+BF)'(Pa-p), 
and then solving for p as: 
p= ýI -Q (A + BF)'] -1 [Wy -ß (A + BF)' Pa] , 
where P is the previously computed stable solution to the algebraic matrix Riccati equation. 
Second case: yt+l =c+ Cyt + Dz2t + Vt+l 
The computation of optimal policy rules under the dynamic constraint in equation 
(1.6) requires rewriting the value function as: 
V(yt)=y y -2yf+d 
and the recursive Bellman equation as: 
V (Yt) = min (yt-Y)'W (Yt-Y) + ßEt 
[Y+iPYt+i 
- 2Yi+iP + d] {z2t +s}s-o 
After substituting forecasts of yt+l from equation (1.6) in the Bellman equation 
(1.11) and taking expectations, the value function can be written as: 
YiWYt +ß (c + Cyt + Dz2t)' P (c + Cyt + Dz2t) 
V (Yc) 
_20 (c + Cyt + Dz2t)' P+ ßE 
(V+iVt+i) +ßd 
Differentiation of fl (yt) with respect to Z2t gives: 
ý1 r (Yt) 
= ßD'Pc + : 3D'PCyt + ßD'Pc+ßD'PCyt + 2ßD'PDz2t+1 - 2ßD'p az2t 
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Setting the first order condition equal to zero and solving for Z2t, the optimal feedback rule 
is written as: 
Z2t =- 
(D'PD) 1 D' [Pc - p] - 
(D'PD) -1 D'PCyt, 
which can be expressed in the compact form: 
Z2t =f+ FYt, (1.12) 
f=- (D'PD) -i1 D' (Pc - P) , 
F=- (D'PD) D'PC. 
As for the previous case, the matrix P is calculated from the stable solution to the 
recursive algebraic matrix Riccati equation: 
Pt+1= W+ßc'Ptc-ßc'PtD (D'tD) -1 D'Ptc, 
while the vector p is computed from: 
P= LI -Q 
(C + DF) J1 LWy -Q 
(C + DE)' PcJ . LL 
Equation (1.12) shows that under the dynamic constraint (1.6), the optimal feedback rule is 
a deterministic linear function relating the current value of the policy instrument to a con- 
stant term and the current value of the state vector. Comparison of the feedback rules in 
equations (1.8) and (1.12) shows that the choice of the timing structure of the constraint 
affects both the magnitude of the response coefficients and the timing structure of the feed- 
back rule. 
1.2 Linear quadratic dynamic programming 24 
1.2.2 Welfare analysis 
The intertemporal loss function in equation (1.1) involves minimisation of the expected 
volatility of the state vector yt+s around the vector of targets Y. To assess the minimum 
welfare cost associated with policy rules in equations (1.8) and (1.12), it is convenient to 
decompose the loss function in equation (1.1) as: 
L= LD + LS 
oc 
LD = Et 
1: 
, 
Qt+s [(Y - y)' W (y - Y)] 
s=o 
m 
Ls = Et 
>, üt+s [(Yt+s-Y)' W (Yt+s-y)], 
s=o 
where E [yt] =y is the unconditional expectation of the state vector. The term LD is the 
deterministic component of the welfare loss, measuring the social cost due to deviation of 
the private sector's rational expectation equilibrium from the medium term policy targets. 
The term LS is the stochastic component of the welfare loss and takes into account the 
social cost arising from the presence of random disturbances in the dynamic constraint. 
Basic matrix algebra can be employed to write LS as: 
00 
Ls = Et 
1: 
, 
ßt+str [(Yt+s-Y)' W (Yt+s-y)] 
, 
s=o 
00 
= Et 
E ßt+str [W (yt+s-Y) (Yt+s-Y)ý], 
s=o 
00 
_ 
Eßt+'&WEt [(Yt+s-Y) (Yt+s-Y)'] 
, 
s=o 
which shows that the stochastic component of the welfare cost is a weighted linear com- 
bination of the variance of the variables included in the state vector yt+s. Therefore, the 
computation of L' requires the assessment in every period t+s of the covariance matrix 
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of the state vector, which can be written as: 
rt+s = Et 
[(Yt+s-y) (Yt+s-y)'] 
. 
25 
(1.13) 
The value Ißt+s under control - and therefore of the minimum stochastic social welfare cost 
- depends upon the specification of the dynamic equation for yt and its computation is 
discussed in the next two subsections. s 
First case: yt+l =a+ Ayt + Bz2t+1 + ut+l 
Substitution of the optimal rule (1.8) into the dynamic constraint in equation (1.5) 
gives: 
Yt+i =a+ Ayt +B (f + FYt) + ut+i 
= a+Bf+(A+BF)+ut+i 
Setting r=a+ Bf and R=A+ BF, the system under control can be written as: 
Yt =r+ RYt- i+ ut. 
Computation of the covariance matrix of the state vector is carried out by first post- 
multiplying equation (1.14) by yt and taking expectations, which gives: 
Et [Yty ]= rt = Et [ry] ]+ Et [RYt-1Yt] + Et [utYt] , 
REt [Yt-iYi] + Et [utut] 
5 For a detailed description of the solution techniques employed in the next two subsections, see Hamilton 
(1994). 
UNI VERITY 
OF YJFA 
BRARY 
(1.14) 
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Moreover, transposing equation (1.14), pre-multiplying by yt_1 and taking expectations 
yields: 
Et [Yt-iy ]= Et [Yt-ire] + Et [Yt-iYt-, R' ý+ Et ýYt-lui] , 
= Et Yt-iYt-, ] R'. 
When s=0, substitution of the above result in equation (1.13) determines the covariance 
matrix of the state vector under control as: 
rt = Rrt_1R'+ Ut. (1.15) 
The above expression is nonlinear and can be solved numerically by setting an initial value 
Fo -0 and computing the next period value IF,, which can then be used to compute F2 
and so on. This recursive procedure can be iterated until convergence to the stable solution 
rt = rt+1= r, which is used to assess the variance of yt in equation (1.13). 
Alternatively, an exact solution can be computed by assuming yt to be a covariance 
stationary process, i. e. rt = rt_1= r, so that equation (1.15) becomes: 
r=RrR'+U. 
The vec operator can then be employed to rewrite the above expression as: 
vecI' = vecRI'R' + vecU, 
= (R®R)vecF+vecU, 
where ® indicates the Kronecker product. Solving for vecF gives: 
vecl' = [I - (R 0 R)]-1 vecU, (1.16) 
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which is the vec representation of the covariance matrix of the state vector under the optimal 
policy rule. 
Both equations (1.15) and (1.16) are equivalent formulas for the assessment of the 
variance of the vector yt under the optimal rule. Since the variance of the vector yt before 
implementation of the optimal rule can be calculated from the the dynamic constraint (1.5) 
as 
I, t = Art-1A'+ Ut, 
the minimum variance in equation (1.15) can then be subtracted from I't to assess the 
welfare gain from the implementation of the optimal rule: 
rt -I't =AI't-lA'-RI't-1R'. (1.17) 
The result in equation (1.17) shows that the welfare gain is independent from the 
volatility of the disturbances in equation (1.5). This is a natural implications of the certainty 
equivalence principle, which states that the implementation of the deterministic optimal 
rule in the stochastic linear dynamic constraint minimises the volatility of the deterministic 
part of the state vector, leaving unchanged the variance of the disturbances. 
Under the stable solution in equation (1.15), the stochastic component of the welfare 
loss function can be computed as: 
00 
Ls =Eo"'trW1= 
1 
trW]F. 
s=o 
1- 
If the covariance matrix of the state vector is computed in the vec form as in equation 
(1.16), - by employing the properties tr (AB) =tr (A'B) = (vecA) (vecB) - LS can be 
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measured as: 
LS =1 (vecW)' [I - (R (9 R)]-' vecU. 1ß 
Second case: yt+l =c+ Cyt + Dz2t + vt+l 
The welfare analysis can be repeated under the constraint in equation (1.6). Substi- 
tution of the optimal rule (1.12) into the constraint gives: 
Yt+l =c+ Df+ 
(C + DF) yt + vt+l. 
Setting q=c+ Df and Q=C+ DF, the system under control can be written as: 
Yt+i =q+ QYt + vc+i " (1.18) 
As for the previous case, the covariance matrix of yt can be computed as: 
rt = Qrt-lQ' + Vt. 
The stable solution ft= If t+1 =r to the above equation can be either calculated 
numerically or in vec form as: 
vecI' = [I - (Q ® Q)]-1 vecV. 
Moreover, the welfare gain from the implementation of the optimal rule (1.12) into the 
constraint (1.6) is given by: 
t- i7 = crt-ic' - Qrt-1Qý. (1.19) 
As for the previous case, the certainty equivalence principle implies that substitution of the 
optimal rule into the stochastic economy constraint minimises the volatility of the deter- 
ministic part of the dynamic equation for the state vector, leaving unchanged the variance 
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of the disturbances. Comparison of the welfare gains in equations (1.17) and (1.19) shows 
that the choice of the timing structure of the constraint affects not only the dynamic struc- 
ture of the optimal feedback rule, but also the implied measure of minimum welfare cost. 
1.2.3 Assessment 
We have shown that the interaction between state and control variables in the dynamic con- 
straint used for the solution to linear quadratic dynamic programming problems affects the 
timing of the optimal policy rule and the magnitude of the optimal response coefficients. 
In addition, the dynamic specification of the state vector equations also alters the measure- 
ment of the welfare cost under the optimal policy. 
The previous analysis discloses at least two issues related to the assessment of opti- 
mal policy rules from VAR models, which will be discussed in the rest of the paper. 
The first issue concerns the identification of the structural model of the economy from 
the reduced form VAR. An important feature of optimal linear regulator problems described 
in the previous two sections is that, after replacing the instrument vector in the constraint 
with the optimal feedback rule, the dynamic equation for the state vector under control 
includes only endogenous variables. In fact, equations (1.14) and (1.18) give two VAR 
representations of the state vector, the first arising from the substitution of the feedback 
rule (1.8) in the constraint in (1.5) and the second from the substitution of the policy rule 
(1.12) into (1.6). Researchers can observe and estimate the reduced form VAR coefficients, 
but may not have a priori knowledge about the decision maker's utility function and the 
model used to predict future values of the state vector. On the other hand, any reduced 
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form VAR model can be thought as the outcome of a dynamic linear quadratic problem. 
In this respect, equations (1.14) and (1.18) disclose a fundamental identification problem 
occurring when estimating a VAR model which includes state and instrument vectors, as the 
optimal policy rule followed by the decision maker cannot be inferred from the observation 
of the VAR model alone. In turn, this implies that an identification technique is required 
to transform the system of endogenous variables into a dynamic constraint suitable for the 
computation of optimal policy rules, which takes the form of either (1.5) or (1.6). 
The second issue related to the assessment of optimal policy rules from VAR models 
concerns the specifications of the deterministic part of the structural model. The certainty 
equivalence principle implies that the optimal policy rule is deterministic and can only 
minimise the volatility of the deterministic part of the state vector in either (1.14) or (1.18). 
Therefore, welfare measures are sensitive to the specification of the deterministic part of 
the VAR model, as this in turn defines the structure of the optimal policy rule. Stochas- 
tic disturbances in the reduced form VAR model capture the effect on the state vector of 
any variable other than those explicitly specified in the model, but - as shown in (1.17) and 
(1.19) - the optimal policy rule does not change the volatility of the stochastic disturbances. 
Therefore, omission of any variable relevant for the assessment of the optimal policy from 
VAR models is bound to result in misspecified policy rules and overstated welfare mea- 
sures. Since traditional VAR analyses of optimal policy rules are based upon reduced form 
VAR models that include objective and instrument variables of a single decision maker, the 
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main source of misspecification arises from omitting the responses to policy actions of any 
other decision maker competing over the control of the economy. 6 
The next section focuses on the issue of identification and compares two alternative 
approaches. Section 5 completes the discussion on the use of VAR model in optimal policy 
analysis by describing how optimal policy rules can be computed within a dynamic game 
VAR framework, which includes several decision makers engaging in strategic interaction 
over the control of the economy. 
1.3 Vector Autoregressive models and optimal control 
Since the seminal work of Sims (1980) VAR models have been widely used in macroeco- 
nomic policy analysis. A natural starting point of an empirical work consists in specifying 
and estimating a VAR model in which the state vector includes non-policy macroeconomic 
variables, some of which may be directly targeted by the policy maker, whereas the control 
vector includes policy variables, which measure the current policy stance. 
In the unrestricted VAR both the state and the control vectors are treated as endoge- 
nous, whereas policy analysis requires conditioning the state vector equations upon an 
exogenous control vector which can be freely changed by the policy maker. The policy 
analysis may focus on assessing the effect of either unanticipated (policy shocks) or an- 
ticipated policy interventions (changes in the policy rule) on the future dynamic of the 
6 In particular, optimal monetary policy analysis focuses on the assessment of interest rate rules from VAR 
models that include objective variables targeted by the central bank, either directly or indirectly, as well as 
the short term policy interest rate. These models fail to include the effect of policy actions of other decision 
makers, such as for example fiscal authorities. See Sack (2000), Martin and Salmon (1999) and Goodhart 
(1999). 
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variables included in the state vector. In the former case, the estimated effect of policy 
changes on the future values of the state variables is assessed through the impulse response 
functions. In the latter case, the purpose of the analysis is to look at the likely pattern of the 
non-policy variables under rules different from that estimated from the unrestricted VAR 
and then assess the corresponding welfare implications. 
Neither of the two types of analysis can be conducted directly on the reduced form 
VAR, and a specific set of restrictions is required to identify policy shocks. Full identi- 
fication of the structural VAR allows computing both impulse response functions and as- 
sessing policy changes. This is however unnecessary if the aim of the analysis is only to 
look at changes in the systematic part of the policy reaction function estimated from the 
unrestricted VAR model, as only a partial identification scheme, which yields so-called 
semi-structural representations of the VAR model, is sufficient in this instance. 
To illustrate these ideas analytically and set the notation, consider the reduced form 
VAR model: 
zt =a+A (L) zt + et, (1.20) 
where zt is a set of endogenous macroeconomic variables, a is a vector of constant terms, 
P 
L is the lag operator, A (L) _ AZL' is the matrix describing the systematic adjustment 
Z=1 
of zt in response to its own lags and et is a vector of serially independent reduced form 
disturbances, with E [et] =0 and E [etet] = E,,,. After ordering state variables before 
control variables, the endogenous vector zt is partitioned as: 
Zt -[ Zit Z2t 
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where zlt is the state vector and z2t is a control vector. Therefore, the VAR model in 
equation (1.20) can be partitioned as: 
Zl, t 
_ 
aio + All (L) A12 (L) 
[Zi, 
t_i 1+ elt Z2, t a20 , (1.21) A21 (L) A22 (L) Z2, t-1 e2t 
and the covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances is accordingly partitioned as: 
_ 
E11 E12 
ýe 
r21 E22 
where Ell is covariance matrix of the disturbances of the state variables, 1122 is the covari- 
ance matrix of the disturbances of the control variables, and E12 is the matrix collecting 
the covariances between the disturbances of state and control variables. ' 
If the policy maker has full control over the instruments included into the control 
vector, the policy equations estimated from the unrestricted VAR capture the reaction func- 
tion of the policy maker over the sample period. In particular, the deterministic part of 
the control vector Z2t is the systematic policy response to changes in the lagged values 
of the variables included in the VAR model, while the innovations measure unanticipated 
changes in policy or policy shocks. Contemporaneously, the equations in the state vector 
zlt captures the dynamic of the non-policy variables under the current policy stance. 
The reduced form innovations can be thought as a linear combination of the uncor- 
related structural shocks Et, with E [Et] =0 and E [etefl = EE. Following the partition 
employed for the reduced form VAR model, the relationship between structural and re- 
duced form innovations is written as: 
7 Since Ee is symmetric, note that T-'12 = Eil. 
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eit 
=B 
Eit 
__ 
I B12 Eit (1.22) e2t E2t B21 I E2t 
A well known issue in VAR models is that the structural system is not identifiable 
given the estimates of the reduced form model, unless an exact number of restrictions is 
imposed on the structural model. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature 
to fully identify a structural model from the reduced form VAR. 
A first identification approach imposes a recursive structure on contemporaneous in- 
teractions between reduced form and structural innovations. Examples of this approach 
include Sims (1972), Bernanke (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998). A well known shortcoming of this identification approach is that the shape 
of the impulse response function obtained from the structural model critically depends upon 
the type of triangular structure imposed on the matrix B, namely whether policy variables 
are ordered before or after non-policy variables. An alternative identification approach ex- 
ploits information coming from the economic theory to impose restrictions on the long run 
effects of the disturbances of the reduced form VAR. This approach has been used by Blan- 
chard and Watson (1986), Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992) among the many 
others. As pointed out by Blanchard and Quah (1989) one can retrieve at most only as 
many types of distinct shocks as there are variables. As a result, identification under this 
approach is difficult to achieve when the economy is likely to be affected by a number of 
shocks that is greater than the variables included in zt. More sophisticated identifications 
approaches focus on imposing sign restrictions on either the impulse response functions, as 
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in Uhlig (1999), or on the cross-correlation between the impulse responses, as in Canova 
and De Nicolo' (2002). 
Once the VAR has been fully identified by any of the approaches mentioned above, 
the structural model can be used not only to assess the response of non-policy variables to 
unanticipated changes in policy, but also the likely implications of changes in the policy 
rule estimated from the reduced form VAR. 
As previously stated, full identification schemes are not necessary to assess the ef- 
fects of changes in the systematic component of policy. In this case it is sufficient to employ 
only a partial identification scheme based upon a block Cholesky decomposition of the re- 
duced form disturbances of state and control variables. The next two sub-sections describe 
two alternative identification approaches and the implications of each of them for the com- 
putation of the policy rule and welfare analysis. The first one is based upon the assumption 
that policy changes can affect the state vector only with a lag, as in equation (1.6). Exam- 
pies of this approach in monetary policy analysis based on VAR models are in Sack (2000) 
and Monti (2003), among the others. I will refer to this as standard approach. An alterna- 
tive approach is to assume the state vector responds to both current and lagged changes in 
the control vector, as in equation (1.5). This approach has been recently proposed by Wick- 
ens (2003) and, to the best of my knowledge, has no been applied in any empirical work so 
far. 
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1.3.1 Standard approach 
The standard identification approach consists in estimating the unrestricted VAR model in 
equation (1.21) and then using the estimated equation for zit in isolation from the rest of 
the system to represent the dynamic constraint linking state and control variables. Given 
the objective function of the policy maker, the constraint can be used to derive an optimal 
policy rule under dynamic programming which would have a dynamic structure consistent 
with that in equation (1.12). More generally, the policy rule takes the form: 
Azit + z2t = ago + Ali (L)zi, t-i + A22 (L)Z2c-i (1.23) 
Welfare analysis is conducted under the standard approach by combining the optimal policy 
rule in (1.23) with the state vector equations in (1.21). This yields the VAR under control 
I0 zit 
_ 
alp 
+ 
I Z2t ago 
+ 
A_ ii (L) A12 zi, t-i + 
[eit 
(1.24) 
A2l(L) A22(L) 
1[7,2, 
t-1 0 
or, re-writing this as a VAR by pre-multiplying by the inverse of the matrix of coefficients 
of zt, 
zit 
_ 
Ali(L)_ A12(L)_ Zl, t-1 
Z2t -AA11(L) + A21(L) -AA12(L) + A22 (L) z2, t-i 
+ 
+ aio + 
elt (1.25) 
-Aalo + ä2o -Aelt 
The VAR under control in the standard approach has the following characteristics. 
First the equations for the non-policy variables are unaffected. Second, the equations for 
the policy instruments in the VAR under control have a disturbance term that is perfectly 
correlated with disturbances in the policy equations. 
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1.3.2 PVAR approach 
The PVAR approach suggests the use of a block Cholesky decomposition to the vector et 
in order to make the reduced form disturbances of the state vector a linear function of the 
corresponding disturbances of the control vector: 
el, t = Eit + Ge2, t 
where elt is the component of el, t which is uncorrelated with e2, t. Therefore, the vector e, t 
has the following state space representation: 
_ 
el, t _IG 
cit ]. 
et e2, t 01iL e2, t 
The matrix E can be used to construct the matrix G as follows: 
G=FJ12F22) 
which gives the transformation matrix 
1H-'= 
J 01 
I 
The matrix H-1 can be used to map the original system onto a new one in which 
the disturbances associated with the state variables are uncorrelated with the disturbances 
associated with the controls: 
H-'zt = H-ia + H-iA (L) Zc-i + H-let, 
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which in turn yields the following system of linear equations: 
Zi, t - Gz2, t = [alo - Ga20] + [All (L) - GA21 (L)] Zi, t-i + 
+ [A12 (L) - GA22 (L)] z2, t_l + el, t - Ge2, t 
Z2, t = a20 + A21 (L) zi, t-i + A22 (L) z2, t-i + e2, t. 
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Since ei, t - Ge2, t = Elt - and e2, t and Elt are uncorrelated - the above system is 
equivalent to 
zl, t = alo + All (L) zi, t-l + A12 (L) z2, t-1 + Eit (1.26) 
-G [a20 + A21 (L) zl, t-1 - z2, t + A22 (L) z2, t-1] 
Z2, t = a20+ A21 (L) Zi, t-i + A22 (L) Z2, t-i + e2, t, (1.27) 
Equation (1.26) can be separated from the VAR rule in equation (1.27) and employed 
as dynamic constraint for the evaluation of policy rules. The state vector zl, t is an autore- 
gressive function of both state and control variables and depends upon the current value 
of the control vector. The matrix G and the other autoregressive response coefficients in 
(1.26) can be computed from either the least squares or maximum likelihood estimates of 
the reduced form VAR model in equation (1.20). 
If we write the optimal control rule as: 
Z2t = ago + A*, (L)zi, t-i + AZ2(L)Z2t-i, 
the VAR under control becomes 
zlt 
_IG 
All (L) - GA21 (L) A12 (L) - GA22 (L) 
[Zlt_l]+ 
z2t -0I 
A*, (L) A22 (L) z2, t_1 
+IG 
alo - Ga20 +IG Ec (1.28) 01 a20 01 0' 
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or 
Zit All (L) - G[A21 (L) - A2, (L)] 
Z2t A21(L) 
+ aio - 
G(a20 - ago) 
.ý 
Et 
ago 0 
A12 (L) -G [A22 (L) - A22 (L)] Zl, t-ý 
A22 (L) Z2 , c-1 
(1.29) 
Thus, in a VAR under control based on the PVAR method, the new equation for the non- 
policy variables differs from the original VAR if the new policy rule differs from the original 
VAR equations for the policy variables. In addition, the VAR under control has a singu- 
lar error covariance matrix because the new VAR equations for the policy variables are 
deterministic. 
More generally, the vector z2t in equation (1.27) can be replaced by any deterministic 
policy rule of the form 
Azlt + Z2t = ago + A*, (L)zi, t-i + A22(L)z2t-i, (1.30) 
which gives a new complete model: 
I -G Zlt _ 
A11(L) - GA21(L) A12(L) - GA22(L) Zl, t-1 + AI 
[Z2t] 
A21(L) A22 (L) Z2, t-1 
+ 
alo - 
Ga20 
+ 
Elt 
ago 0 
and the VAR representation: 
zit 
_I -G 
-1 Ail (L) - GA21(L) A12(L) - GA22 (L) zi, t-i + 
z2t -AI A21 (L) A22 (L) z2, t-I 
+I -G 
-1 aio - Ga20 +I -G Eit A1 a20 A10' 
As a result, if the policy rule incudes contemporaneous responses to changes in the 
state variables, then the PVAR approach yields a VAR model under control with a singular 
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variance-covariance matrix because the new VAR equations for the policy variables are 
deterministic. 
1.3.3 Assessment 
The PVAR and the standard approach represent two alternative methodologies to identify 
from an unrestricted VAR model a stochastic dynamic constraint that can be employed 
for the solution to dynamic linear quadratic problems. From a theoretical point of view 
the standard approach is equivalent to assume B12 =0 in equation (1.22), i. e. that policy 
shocks affect state variables with a lag. Consequently, if optimisation is carried out through 
dynamic programming, the dynamic structure of the optimal policy rule is consistent with 
that in equation (1.12) which states that the control responds responds to current change in 
the state vector. 
The plausibility of this assumption critically depends upon two factors: the type of 
macroeconomic variables included in the state vector and the unit of observation of the 
data. Since the empirical evidence suggests that output and inflation respond with delay to 
changes in the interest rate, the standard identification approach works well in the context of 
monetary policy analysis based on VAR models, which include observations of output and 
inflation in the state vector and of the interest rate in the control. However, the standard 
approach is inappropriate if the state vector includes other variables which are likely to 
quickly react to policy changes, such as financial market variables. In addition, it is unlikely 
that macroeconomic variables respond with delay to policy changes when data are available 
on a low frequency basis. For example, if data are available on a quarterly basis, then 
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output is likely to respond to changes in policy within the period of observation. As a 
result, forcing output to respond with a lag, as under the standard approach, would yield a 
misspecified representation of the dynamic links between state and control variables, hence 
the wrong solution when computing the optimal policy. Stock and Watson (2001) argue 
against the use of the standard identification approach even with monthly data. Because 
most of macroeconomic data are available at least on a quarterly basis, this implies that the 
standard identification approach is of little use in macroeconomic analysis. 
The PVAR identification approach is based upon a block Cholesky decomposition 
which effectively is equivalent to assume B21 =0 in equation (1.22). This has the ad- 
vantage of leaving the linear dynamic structure of the state vector equations entirely unre- 
stricted. In fact, under the PVAR approach the state vector equations are conditioned upon 
both current and lagged value of the control, as well as their own lags. In this respect, the 
PVAR approach allow the inclusion of a wider range of variables in the state vector equa- 
tions and it is suitable for the analysis of both high and low frequency data. Indeed, the 
structural VAR model derived under the standard approach is a special case of that result- 
ing from the PVAR approach, obtained by setting G=0 in equation (1.26). If optimisation 
is carried out through dynamic programming, then the dynamic structure of the policy rule 
obtained under the PVAR approach is consistent with that in equation (1.8). This implies 
that policy makers respond with a lag to changes in the state vector, which reflects the 
presence of information lags in the policy response to changes in the non-policy variables. 
However, the structural VAR model obtained under the PVAR approach can be combined 
with any unrestricted rule, such as in equation (1.30). In this instance optimisation can be 
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carried out by grid searching through the parameters of (1.30), given the policy maker ob- 
jective function and the constraint in (1.26). This entirely unrestricted linear framework 
cannot be achieved under the standard approach. 
1.4 Dynamic games 
1.4.1 Related Literature 
Dynamic optimisation often involves problems which include more than one decision maker. 
The presence of more than one decision maker give raise to dynamic games models which 
have been extensively studied in several areas of both microeconomics and macroeco- 
nomics. Examples include industrial organisation and price determination - Beggs and 
Klemperer (1992) Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Karp and Perloff (1989), Reynolds (1991) 
- exhaustible and renewable resources - Hansen et al. (1985), Lindsey (1989) -, policy cred- 
ibility - Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1986) - international policy co- 
ordination - Cohen and Michel (1988), Currie et al. (1989), Miller and Salmon (1985a, 
b, 1990) - and monetary policy games - Obstfeld (1991), Lockwood and Phillipopoulos 
(1994). 
A branch of the literature has focused on the interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policy and the alternative welfare implications of different types of interactions between the 
central bank and the government, for example Pindyk (1977), Tabellini (1988), Benigno 
and Woodford (2003) and Dixit and Lambertini (2003). A recent empirical assessment of 
the predictions arising from this literature is provided by Kirsanova et al. (2005). The 
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authors add to the conventional IS curve-Phillips curve-Taylor rule model of Svensson 
(1997) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) two further equations which take into account 
the conduct of fiscal policy and the dynamic accumulation of public debt. The model 
is calibrated to study stabilisation policy under alternative types of competitions between 
monetary and fiscal authorities. 
On the other hand, VAR models have been extensively used to assess separately 
the effects of either monetary policy shocks, for example Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
Bernanke and Mihow (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), or fiscal 
shocks, see for example Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2000). More 
recently, simultaneous assessment of monetary and fiscal shocks has been proposed by 
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002). VAR models have also been employed for the com- 
putation of optimal monetary policy rules in the United States, see Sack (2000), and in the 
United Kingdom, see Martin and Salmon (1998). However, to the best of my knowledge, 
VAR models have not been exploited so far to evaluate how optimal monetary policy is af- 
fected by the presence of the fiscal sector, under alternative types of competitions between 
monetary and fiscal authorities. Consequently the next subsections discuss the computation 
of optimal policy rules under alternative strategies of the policy makes when the dynamic 
structure of the economy is initially observed from the perspective of an unrestricted VAR 
model. 
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1.4.2 Setting up the model 
A dynamic game model is usually designed by first specifying the objective function, the 
policy instruments and the stylized forecasting model employed by each decision maker, 
and then assessing the welfare outcome of policy decisions by taking into account alter- 
native types of interactions among policy makers. So far, little attention has been given 
to the assessment of dynamic games models when the macroeconomic framework is ob- 
served from a reduced form VAR model. In principle, the VAR model has to be specified 
in terms of objective and instrument variables of all decision makers competing over the 
control of the economy. The identification problem is more complex than the individual 
policy maker case, as it requires knowledge of all policy makers' preferences as well as 
assumptions about the interaction of each policy instrument with both state variables and 
other policy instruments. 
More importantly, the identification strategy and the solution to the dynamic game 
model depends upon the type of interaction among decision makers. A Markov perfect 
solution occurs when each decision maker solves his own optimisation problem by taking 
other players' best strategies as given. A special case of the Markov perfect solution arises 
when the optimiser knows that others decision makers are committed to an ad hoc policy 
rule. A cooperative solution results when all decision makers pool together their policy 
instruments to jointly optimise a common utility function. Finally, a Stackelberg solution 
occurs when policy makers are ranked in terms of their decision power, as either leader or 
follower, and act strategically by taking into account other players' optimal responses. 
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A preliminary issue when using VAR systems to analyse dynamic games models is 
to appropriately allocate the variables included in the endogenous vector yt between the 
state vector zit and the control vector z2t. There are two sets of variables that can be em- 
bodied into yt. The first is a vector xt =[ x1 x2 ... Xq 
] of the so called natural state 
variables, which refers to macroeconomic variables directly targeted by decision makers, 
as well as any other variable that indirectly affects the expected value of targeted variables. ' 
The second set of variables, when there are n>1 decision makers, includes each policy 
makers' instrument vector vj, with j=1, ..., n. 
While natural state variables are always included into zit, the location of the instru- 
ment vectors vas depends upon the type of interaction among policy makers. Under the 
two Nash solutions, the optimiser treats other policy makers' reaction functions as given 
and includes their policy instruments into the state vector zit. Under the cooperative solu- 
tion, only natural state variables are included into the vector zit, as all policy instruments 
are jointly employed in the optimisation. This implies that under Markov perfect and co- 
operative solutions, the dynamic optimisation problem preserves its recursive structure and 
can be still solved using the dynamic programming as in the single decision maker case. 
Computation of optimal policy rules is more complicated when decision makers inter- 
act strategically as in a leader-follower scenario, since standard recursive techniques cannot 
be applied to compute optimal policy rules. This is because other decision makers' reac- 
tion functions cannot be treated as recursive state variables when a decision maker chooses 
his optimal policy in a rational expectation framework where several decision makers com- 
8 See Ljunggvist and Sargent (2004). 
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pete over the control of the economy. In this case, the optimal policy is time inconsistent, 
in the sense that other decision makers respond to the optimal policy and therefore change 
its expected outcomes. However, Kydland and Prescott (1980) argued that these types of 
optimal control problems can still be solved by recursive methods by treating other policy 
makers' reaction functions as recursive bounding constraints. The next four subsections 
examine the application of the PVAR approach to compute policy rules in VAR based dy- 
namic games having either a Nash or the cooperative or the leader-follower solution. 
1.4.3 Linear Markov perfect equilibria 
In a dynamic game model with two players, j=1,2, a linear Markov strategy occurs when 
at any time t player J's action is restricted to be linearly dependent on the past history of 
play through the state vector. In this framework a Markov perfect equilibrium is a pair 
of linear Markov strategies giving the mutual best responses at any possible state of the 
world. In a dynamic macroeconomic model, the utility function of the decision maker j 
can be written as: 
00 
Lit = Et ßt+s 
I(yt+, 
-Yj), Wj 
(yt+s -Yj) 
] 
s=o 
where yj and Wj indicate the j- th decision maker's preferences over the policy targets 
and the arguments of the objective function respectively. The vector yt+s is specified by 
treating as state variables all policy instruments different from those of the j- th decision 
maker, that is: 
Zlt+s L Xt+s Vlt+s v2t+s vj-lt+s vj+lt+s vnt+s 
] 
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and 
Z2t = vet+s 
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The PVAR approach can be employed to transform the VAR model into a dynamic 
constraint of the form of (1.5). Since this dynamic optimisation problem is entirely recur- 
sive in the state vector, the optimal policy rule can then be computed through the dynamic 
programming method, as for the single policy maker case described in section 2. Under the 
Markov perfect equilibrium, the j- th decision maker's optimal rule is a linear determin- 
istic function relating the current value of the instrument vector vet to a constant, lagged 
values of natural state variables and other policy makers' instruments, that is: 
Zit-1 
(1.31) vet = fn + Fn 
Zit-p 
, V jt-1 
V jt-p 
where the coefficients fn, and F, z are computed as in equation (1.8). 
An important special case occurs when the optimiser knows that all other policy 
makers are bounded by a commitment technology, such as an explicit policy rule. The 
solution to this problem is not a Markov perfect equilibrium because the optimiser takes 
into account the ad hoc rule of the other policy makers, rather than their best reaction 
function. To simplify, suppose there are only two decision makers so that the instrument 
vector is partitioned as 
vt =[V lt V 2t 
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where vlt includes instruments of decision makers committed to the policy rule, while vet 
is the vector of instruments of the optimiser. The reduced form VAR can be partitioned 
accordingly as: 
Xt alo All (L) A12 (L) A13 (L) xt-1 elt 
Vit = a20 + A21 (L) A22 (L) A23 (L) Vit-1 + e2t 
V2t a30 A31 (L) A32 (L) A33 (L) V2t-1 e3t 
so that natural state variables are separated from the two instrument vectors. Under the 
PVAR approach, the transformation matrix 
LI 
-Gi -G2 
H= 0I0 
00I J 
can be computed to make the instrument vectors of both policy makers exogenous and 
determine dynamic constraint 
I -G1 -G2 Xt I- G1 -G2 alo 
0 I 0 VU = 0 I0 a20 + 
0 0 I VFt 0 0I a30 
I -G1 -G2 A11 (L) A12 (L) A13 (L) Xt-i 
+0 I 0 A21 (L) A22 (L) A23 (L) VLt_1 + 
0 0 I A31 (L) A32 (L) A33 (L) VFt_1 
I -G1 -G2 eit 
+ 0I 0 e2t 
00 1 eat 
At this stage, the coefficients corresponding to the instrument vector vlt can be re- 
placed with those of the ad hoc policy rule 
Qxt + Vit + Mv2t = ago + A21(L)xc-i + A22(L)vit-i + A23(L)v2t-i + etc, 
to obtain the new model 
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I -G1 -G2 Xt I- G1 -G2 Q I M Vit = 0 I0 
0 0 I vet 0 0I 
I -G1 -G2 A11 (L) A12 (L) A13 (L) 
+0 I 0 A21 (L) A22 (L) A23 (L) 
0 0 I A31 (L) A32 (L) A33 (L) 
I -G1 -G2 eit 
+ 0I 0 e2t 
00 1 eat 
alo 
a20 + 
a30 
Xt-1 
vlt-1 + 
V2t-1 
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After erasing the coefficients corresponding to the control vector vet and solving for 
the state vector Xt , the constraint of the economy can be written as: V it 
Xt 
V it 
-G1 I -G1 alo I -G1 - GZ Q I Lo I j[a*j+ 20 [Q 0 ]a3o+ 
+I -G1 
]-l I -G2 All (L) A12 (L) Als (L) Xt-1 
Q I 0I A21 (L) A22 (L) A23 (L) + vlt_1 
+ 
I -G1 
Q 
_l _G1 
p 
[A31 (L) A32 (L) A33 (L) ] vet-i 
I -G1 -G2 I- V2t+ 
G1 -i I -Gi eit 
Q I 
[q 
Mj I 0I LetI 
I _G1 - G2 
QI 0 est 
which is compatible with the dynamic system in equation (1.5), with y't =[ Zit ... 
zit ={ xt vlt ] and z2t = vet. Therefore, under this special case of the Nash solution, 
the optimal policy rule 
Zit-1 
V2t=fr+FT 
Zit-p 
V 2t-1 
V 2t-p 
is a linear function embodying optimal responses to changes in the objective variables 
Zlt-p Z2t 
targeted by the optimiser and rule-based changes of other decision makers' instruments. 
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A cooperative solution occurs when all decision makers coordinate their policy rules in 
order to achieve common objectives. This scenario can be described by assuming decision 
makers simultaneously employing all policy instruments to minimise a common objective 
function, as in equation (1.1), under a common forecasting model of the form of either (1.5) 
or (1.6). This implies that the vector zlt+s includes only natural state variables, while the 
control vector Z2t+S embodies all available policy instruments, that is: 
Zlt+s - Xt+s 
and 
Z2t+s =[ vlt+s V2t+s 2Jnt+s 
, 
The PVAR approach can be employed to compute a dynamic constraint in which the current 
value of natural state variables is conditioned upon the current value of the exogenous 
control vector z2. The dynamic optimisation problem can then be solved by minimising 
the cost function (1.1) with respect to z2 by employing the recursive dynamic programming 
method as in the single decision maker case. The solution to this dynamic problem implies 
that each policy maker has to commit to a specific optimal policy rule which relates his 
own policy instruments to natural state variables, but also takes into account the optimal 
behaviour of other policy makers. Therefore, the optimal policy rule can be written as: 
Z2t = fc+Fc 
Xt-1 
Xt_p 
Z2t-1 
Z2t-p 
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and each equation of z2t refers to the optimal policy rule of a decision maker under coop- 
eration. 
1.4.5 Stackelberg solution 
The assessment of either a Nash or the cooperative solution to a dynamic game from a 
VAR model specified in terms of all objective and instrument variables mainly requires the 
appropriate allocation of available policy instruments between state and control vectors. 
Once this task is accomplished, the dynamic game problem is solved by employing the 
same recursive technique used for the single decision maker case. This is because, the 
underlying nature of the dynamic optimisation problem under both Nash and cooperative 
scenarios remains recursive. 
When policy makers act strategically the solution to a dynamic optimisation problem 
is more complex as each decision maker sets the optimal policy given his prediction of 
other policy makers' reaction functions. In a leader-follower scenario, for instance, the 
follower's decisions in each period t is influenced by the forecast of the dominant player's 
next period action. In principle, the dominant player can either confirm or invalidate the 
follower's prediction. In the latter case the solution to the dynamic problem would exhibit 
time inconsistency and cannot be computed using a recursive technique. However, if the 
leader is bound to validate the follower's expectations, the reaction function of the follower 
can be interpreted as a constraint for the dominant player and a value can be attached to this 
constraint in terms of the cost of confirming past follower's expectations about the current 
behaviour of the leader. In this case, the Stackelberg problem is entirely recursive in both 
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the natural state variables and the bounding constraint and can be solved for the dominant 
player by using standard recursive dynamic programming methods. ' 
Consider the vector of policy instruments partitioned as 
Vt VLt VFt ]/, 
where VLt is the vector of leader's instruments and VFt is the vector of follower's instru- 
ments. The economy constraint is computed from a VAR model of the economy which can 
be partitioned as: 
Zit alo All (L) 
VLt 
[a2oj+[A21(L) 
A12 (L) Zit-1 
+ 
elt 
A22 (L) 
[VLt_1 
e2t 
(1.33) 
where the state vector zit =[ xt VFt ]' embodies natural state variables and the fol- 
lower's reaction function, the latter being interpreted as an intertemporal constraint re- 
flecting the leader commitment to confirm in each period the follower's forecast of his 
actions. 1° Under the PVAR approach, the transformation matrix H-' =0I -G 1 can 
be employed to make the control vector VLt exogenous as: 
I -G zit 1 
[0 
I] VLt 0 
+I 
+rI 
-G a10 + I a20 
-G All (L) 
I A21 (L) 
-G elt 
I e2t 
A12 (L) Zit-i 1 A22 (L) [VLt_1 
9 For a rigorous discussion of the solution to dynamic games models under strategic competition, see Kyd- 
land and Prescott (1980) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). 
10 The VAR model in (1.33) is a compact system obtained by replacing v11 for VFt and v2L for vLt in 
equation (1.32). 
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In the single decision maker case, the matrix G is equal to the product between the co- 
variance matrix of the disturbances in the state and instrument vectors and the variance of 
the instrument vector's disturbances. In the Stackelberg problem, G includes also a sec- 
and term corresponding to the product between the covariance matrix of the disturbances in 
the bounding constraint and instrument vectors, and the variance of the instrument vector's 
disturbances. 
Under the certainty equivalence principle, the above dynamic constraint for the leader 
is compatible with the deterministic system: 
Yt = AY1t-1 + BVLt, (1.34) 
where yt =[ Zit ... zlt-p VD """V Lt-p 
]' and the vector of state variables zit is 
augmented with VFt ... V Ft-p to take into account the cost for the leader accruing 
from confirming past periods' predictions of the follower about his current behaviour. 
If employing a quadratic objective function as in equation (1.1), the optimal policy 
rule for the leader takes the form: 
VLt = fo + F0Yt-1 (1.35) 
Given the interpretation of the variables included into yt, the optimal decision rule of the 
leader is dependent not only upon the forecasting model employed to predict natural state 
variables, but also on the follower's best response to the sequence of actions undertaken 
by the leader, as embedded in the vectors VFt ... VFt_p . 
The response coefficients f,, 
and Fo are calculated as in (1.8), which requires the computation of the stable solution to 
a matrix Riccati equation as in (1.10). In a Stackelberg optimisation problem, 
it is conve- 
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nient to determine the solution to the matrix Riccati equation by employing the Lagrangian 
method, since this allows a reinterpretation of the coefficients in the stable solution of the 
matrix Riccati equation P, which can then be exploited to solve the model through recursive 
techniques. Before forming the Lagrangian, the one-period utility function is decomposed 
as: 
(Yt-Y)' W (Yt-Y) = (Yt-Y)'R (Yt-Y) + VLtQV Lt, 
where R+Q=W and the matrix R assigns zero values to the diagonal coefficients cor- 
responding to the vector VLt in yt. This implies that the Stackelberg problem can be written 
in the following Lagrangian form: 
00 
G= Et E ßt 
(Yt+s-Y)' R (Yt+3-Y) + vLt+SQVLt+s+ 
s=o 
+2ßµt+3 (a + Ayt+3 + BuLt+s+i Yt+s+i) 
where µt+, is a vector of shadow prices associated with the sequence of dynamic con- 
straints in the Lagrangian. Given the definition of yt+s, the vector of shadow prices µt+, 
can be partitioned conformably as: 
tLt+s 
[ 
tLXt+s IIVFt+s µXt+s-P tLVFt+s-P PVLt+s %IVLt+. 
s_p J7 
where the sequence of multipliers µvFt+s " pvFt+s_p represent the set of shadow 
prices attached to the bounding constraints of the leader reflecting the cost of honoring 
current and past follower's expectations about future leader's policy choices, as captured 
by the reaction functions corresponding to VFt+s, """'VFt+s-p" 
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After taking expectations, the first order conditions with respect to yt and VLt+l are 
calculated as: 
ÖL 
_ -2ßtµt + 2ßtRYt + 2, ßt+lAuhµt+i, (1.36) Oyt 
2ßt+1B/µt+i + 2ßt+1QvLt+i" (1.37) DVLt+i 
Solving the first order condition (1.37) for VLt+l and substituting the solution in 
equation (1.34), the dynamic constraint can be written as: 
Yt+i = Ayt + BQ-1B'µt+i (1.38) 
and the system of first order conditions obtained by combining (1.36) and (1.38) has the 
following state space representation: 
10 I BQ-'B' yt+, 
__ 
A0 yt (1.39) 
ßA' lit+, -R 1 
Ht]' 
with stable solution given by: 
At = PYt " 
(1.40) 
To compute P, substitution of the solution (1.40) into the system in equation (1.39) 
yields: 
(I + BQ-'B'P) Yt+l = AYt (1.41) 
ßA'PYt+j = (-R + P) Yt. (1.42) 
Since 
(I + BQ-1B'P)-1 =I- ßB (Q + ßB'PB)-' B'P 
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equation (1.41) can be solved for yt+l to obtain: 
Yt+i _ 
[A 
- ßB (Q + ßB'PB)-' B'PA] Yt. 
After setting Q=0 and substituting R for W, the term 0 (Q + ßB'PB)-' B'PA be- 
comes equivalent to the matrix F from equation (1.8) and yt+i is written as: 
Yt+l = (A-BF')yt" 
Premultiplying both sides in the above expression by the term /A'P gives: 
ßA'PYt+j = ,i 
(A'PA - A'PBF) Yt, 
which can be equated to the right hand side of (1.42) and solved for P to obtain: 
P= W+ßA'PA-ßA'PB (B'PB)-1 B'PA 
(1.43) 
which shows that the stable solution P to the dynamic system (1.39) is the same algebraic 
matrix Riccati required to compute the response coefficients in the optimal feedback rule 
(1.35). 
Therefore, the matrix P can be partitioned in order to decode all information associ- 
ated with the Lagrangian multipliers of the constraint in equation (1.40) as: 
Ant 
_ 
PH P12 kt 
IIVFt P21 P22 
[VFt]' 
where µ, ßt 
is the vector of shadow prices associated with 
Kt =[ Xt Xt-1 VFt-1 """ Xt-p VFt-p VLt """ 
VLt-p 
The solution to µ,,, t is calculated as 
µvb't = P21 kt + P22V Ft, 
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which leads to the following formulation of the vector uFt: 
VFt = P22µvFt -P22P21kt 
The state vector and the vector of shadow prices can now be written, respectively, as: 
57 
Yt ==0 t VFt -pa ý'21 pi 
(1.44) 
2 22 µvF 
and 
µvFt =[ P21 P22 
] 
V Ft 
The optimal leader decision rule in equation (1.35) is thus computed as: 
VLt - -f0 - Fo L-P 
I1P21 
D1 
ýt (1.45) 
22 22 PvF t 
0 
Finally, both equations (1.44) and (1.45) can be embodied in the dynamic constraint (1.43) 
to write the state vector under control and optimal feedback rule of the follower respectively 
as: 
F Kt+i =I0 (A - BFo) I0 Kt %Iv,: t+l P21 P22 -P22 p21 P22 [vEt 
VFt =[ -P22 
P21 P- Kt 
µvpt 
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper addresses the issue of measuring policy rules when the economy is represented 
by a VAR model. I describe a new partial-identification approach which has the advan- 
tage, over the existing methodologies, of leaving the dynamic structure of the state vector 
equations in the semi-structural VAR model entirely unrestricted, since it conditions the dy- 
namic of the state variables to both current and lagged values of the control vector, rather 
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than the lagged values alone as under the standard approach. The problem with the standard 
identification approach is well summarised by Stock and Watson in their 2001 review paper 
on VAR models: "... the timing conventions in VARs do not necessarily reflect real-time 
data availability, and this undercuts the common method of identifying restrictions based 
on timing assumptions. For example, a common assumption made in structural VARs is 
that variables like output and inflation are sticky and do not respond "within the period" to 
monetary policy shocks. This seems plausible over the period of a single day, but becomes 
less plausible over a month or quarter... " [Stock, and Watson, (2001), pp. 112]. 
In this respect, I believe, the new identification approach represents an improvement 
over the existing methodologies. The approach can be implemented for the computation 
of optimal policy rules within conventional output-inflation-interest rate VAR models used 
for monetary policy analysis to evaluate to what extent the choice of the identification ap- 
proach affects the response coefficients in the interest rate under the optimal rule and the 
welfare measurements. A similar analysis can then be extended to the evaluation of opti- 
mal fiscal rules. Furthermore, the PVAR approach is preferable to the standard one when 
the state vector equations includes financial market variables such as stock market prices 
or term structure which are bound to react immediately to policy changes. In this respect, 
the PVAR identification approach can be used for assessing optimal macroeconomic pol- 
icy rules within macro-finance VAR models of the economy. Finally, as already argued in 
section 4, there is a growing interest in the macroeconomic literature on the simultaneous 
assessment of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. This literature points out that optimal 
policy and welfare measures depends upon the type of interactions between monetary and 
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fiscal authorities. So far, and to the best of my knowledge, a preliminary assessment of 
these finding has been carried out by using stylised - backward looking - models of the 
economy. I describe how VAR models can be employed to compute optimal policy rules 
under multiple policy makers competing over the control of the economy. This provides 
an alternative framework against which one can compare the traditional findings of the 
literature on the interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities. The empirical imple- 
mentation of this framework is part of my future research agenda. 
Chapter 2 
Assessing optimal monetary policy through 
VAR models 
Abstract 
This paper assesses both theoretically and empirically a new approach - PVAR method 
- to formulate optimal policy based on a quadratic intertemporal welfare function where the 
dynamic constraint of the economy is derived from a VAR model. The paper argues that 
the VAR under control should not be derived simply by replacing the VAR equation for 
the policy instruments by an optimal control rule because this alters the stochastic structure 
of the state vector equations, and gives a state space representation of the dynamic con- 
straint in which state variables can only respond to lagged values of the control. Instead, 
one should first transform the VAR in order to condition the non-policy variables on the 
policy instruments, then use the resulting sub-system as the dynamic constraint, and finally 
construct the VAR under control by combining this sub-system with the resulting optimal 
policy rule. In this way the original stochastic structure of the state vector equations of the 
VAR is retained. In addition, under the PVAR approach the state variables in the dynamic 
constraint are conditioned upon both current and lagged values of the control, hence giv- 
ing a representation of the macroeconomic framework more suitable for policy analysis. In 
comparing the two approaches, the paper explains the theoretical advantages of the PVAR 
over the standard method and applies both methods by examining the formulation of opti- 
mal monetary policy rules using US data for the period 1960-2003. The empirical findings 
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show that feedback rules predicted under the PVAR approach are smoother than those cal- 
culated under the standard approach and welfare losses are considerably overstated by the 
standard approach, regardless of the specification of the objective function. We suggest 
that since the whole process is easily automated, the PVAR method may provide a useful 
benchmark for use in real time against which to compare other, probably far more labour 
intensive, policy choices. 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper studies optimal monetary policy rules obtained from the maximisation of an in- 
tertemporal quadratic objective function based on a trade-off between inflation and output 
subject to a dynamic constraint that is derived from a vector autoregressive (VAR) model 
of the economy. The choice of a quadratic objective function in inflation and output (or 
the output gap) reflects common practice in the control and inflation targeting literatures, 
for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Sack (2000). A more formal justifi- 
cation was provided by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) - see also Woodford (2003) - 
who showed that such a quadratic function can be derived as an approximation to a micro 
founded macro model with standard preferences in terms of consumption. 
As far as the choice of the intertemporal constraint relating targeted variables to pol- 
icy instruments is concerned, pioneering works of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and 
Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) studied optimal monetary policy within rational expec- 
tations models of output and inflation. In contrast, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) used 
a dynamic constraint obtained from an entirely backward looking model of output and in- 
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flation. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) looked at 
monetary policy from the perspective of New Keynesian models, thus assessing optimal 
rules by using a dynamic constraint with forward looking components in both the aggre- 
gate demand and supply equations. Optimal policy will clearly be affected by this choice. 
A more agnostic approach, that seeks to avoid imposing a constraint not supported by the 
data, is to use instead a data-based VAR. Since it is a theory free model, the assessment of 
policy rules from a VAR model is not biased by the choice of the structural model of the 
economy employed by the decision maker. However, using VAR models to study optimal 
monetary policy presents two major issues. The first is related to the fact that a change of 
policy rule alters the VAR model. As a result, there must be a concern that any VAR is 
vulnerable to structural change. In principle, therefore, the Lucas Critique applies here. In 
practice, however, like Rudebusch (2002), we find that structural change to a VAR as a re- 
suit of changing policy appears not to be much in evidence. Without wishing to claim that 
basing policy on VAR is a first-best approach compared with using a correctly-specified 
structural model, given the difficulty of agreeing on what that structural model should be, 
using a VAR may still provide a helpful benchmark against which to compare a first-best 
policy and any other policies such as one based on a Taylor rule or a policy of discretion. 
The second issue arising when assessing optimal policy rules from VAR models is 
that in a VAR all variables are endogenous, whereas computation of an optimal policy rule 
requires a dynamic constraint in which state variables are conditioned upon exogenous pol- 
icy instruments. For this reason an identification technique is required to extract from the 
VAR a state space representation of the economy in which state variables are conditioned 
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on the exogenous vector of policy instruments. The standard identification approach re- 
suits in a dynamic constraint in which policy actions can only have a delayed effect on the 
state vector. Sack (2000) shows how this may be accomplished using a VAR in which the 
disturbances in the equations for the non-policy and policy variables are assumed to be un- 
correlated. Martin and Salmon (1999) also use a VAR but with a different set of identifying 
restrictions from Sack. Having obtained the optimal policy rule, forecasts of the non-policy 
variables are derived from the VAR under control by replacing the original VAR equations 
for the policy instruments by the optimal policy rule. We refer to this methodology as the 
standard approach. Stock and Watson (2001) have made a related suggestion, namely to 
replace the interest rate equation in a VAR with a Taylor rule. This has the added drawback 
that the Taylor rule may not be an optimal choice. 
Rather than make any assumptions about the correlation structure of the disturbances 
in the state vector equations of the VAR, we estimate the VAR unrestrictedly and then 
derive the dynamic constraint relating the non-policy variables to the policy instruments 
by transforming the VAR so that the non-policy variables are conditioned on the policy 
instruments. Having derived the optimal policy rule, we construct the VAR under control 
by combining the sub-system of equations for the non-policy variables that make up the 
dynamic constraint with the optimal rule. We refer to this approach as the policy VAR 
(PVAR) method. 
The paper examines in detail the theoretical and empirical implications for optimal 
monetary policy of the PVAR approach and compares its outcomes with those arising from 
the standard methodology. From a theoretical perspective, the paper demonstrates that the 
2.1 Introduction 64 
choice of the identification approach has profound effects on both the dynamic structure of 
the policy rule and the magnitude of its response coefficients. Under the standard approach 
substitution of the optimal policy rule into the economy constraint minimises the volatility 
of the deterministic part of the state vector equation alone. The paper proves that under the 
PVAR approach the same operation minimises the volatility of the stochastic component of 
the state vector, as well as its deterministic part. 
Empirical comparison of the PVAR and the standard approach is carried out by as- 
sessing optimal interest rate rules under alternative specifications of the objective function 
using US data for the period 1960-2003. The results show that optimal policy rules pre- 
dicted under the PVAR approach deliver smoother feedback rates than those predicted un- 
der the standard approach. In line with Rudebush (2001), this finding corroborates the view 
that a plausible explanation of the gap between the response coefficients of the optimal and 
the VAR interest rate rule lies in the misspecification of the forecasting model employed 
by the policy maker, rather than in the uncertainty surrounding the precise values of the 
model's parameters. " Moreover, welfare losses computed under the PVAR approach are 
lower than those calculated under the standard approach, regardless of the specification of 
the objective function. This outcome occurs because, after substitution of the optimal rule 
into the dynamic constraint, output and inflation forecasts obtained from the PVAR ap- 
proach are systematically smoother and faster converging toward their targets than under 
the standard approach. 
For a survey on the effects of uncertainty on optimal policy rules, see Sack and Wieland (2000). 
2.2 Formulating the dynamic constraint from a VAR 65 
The discussion is articulated in five sections following this introduction. The next 
section describes the PVAR approach and compares it with the standard methodology. Sec- 
tion 3 shows how dynamic programming is used under the two methodologies to compute 
optimal policy rules. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical specification of the 
dynamic optimisation problem under both approaches. Section 5 comments on the main 
empirical findings and Section 6 concludes. State space representations of the dynamic 
constraint under the PVAR and the standard approach, as well as all tables and figures are 
reported in appendices at the end of the paper. 
2.2 Formulating the dynamic constraint from a VAR 
VAR models have been widely employed for the assessment of optimal macroeconomic 
policy rules (Sack (2000), Martin and Salmon (1999) Monti (2003)). This is accomplished 
in several steps. The first step consists in specifying and estimating a reduced form VAR 
model including state variables targeted by the policy maker and control variables, which 
represent the instruments used by the policy maker in the conduct of policy. The state vector 
may also include other variables which are not directly targeted by the policy maker, but 
may be involved in the transmission mechanism from the policy instruments to the policy 
targets. 
The second step consists in the identification of the dynamic constraint of the econ- 
omy from the reduced form VAR. For the purpose of computing and evaluating optimal 
policy rules, this second task is accomplished by imposing a block Cholesky decomposition 
between the disturbances of the state and control variables. The resulting semi-structural 
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VAR gives a sufficient state space representation of the dynamic of the economy for the 
computation of optimal policy rules. In particular, the traditional identification approach is 
based upon the assumption that policy actions have no immediate effect on state variables. 
Consequently, the dynamic constraint of the economy coincides with the VAR equations 
for the non-policy variables. This constraint is combined with a welfare function of the pol- 
icy maker - commonly chosen to be a quadratic function of the targets around their desired 
values - in order to compute optimal policy rules. If optimisation is carried out through dy- 
namic programming, then the optimal policy rule relates the instruments to the current and 
lagged values of the non-policy variables, as well as lagged values of the control vector. 
Welfare analysis is carried out by replacing the original VAR equations for the policy in- 
struments with the optimal policy rule to form a new VAR in the state variables, the VAR 
under control. The main drawback of this methodology is that it is only valid if, in the 
reduced form VAR, the disturbances of the non-policy and policy variables are uncorre- 
lated. In addition, Stock and Watson (2001) argue that the standard identification approach 
is of limited use in macroeconomic policy analysis as it implausibly imposes a delay in the 
response of output and prices to changes in policy. 
In response to these criticisms, an alternative identification approach, hereafter PVAR 
approach, based upon an identification methodology which is valid when the disturbances 
of the non-policy and policy variables are correlated in the reduced form VAR. The PVAR 
approach yields a semi-structural VAR model in which changes in the state variables are 
related to current and lagged values of the control vector, as well as lags of the state vector. 
Therefore, the PVAR approach has the advantage, over the existing methodology, of not 
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imposing any timing restriction in the state space representation of the dynamic constraint 
of the economy. Under the PVAR method, we estimate the VAR unrestrictedly and then 
derive the dynamic constraint relating the non-policy variables to the policy instruments by 
transforming the VAR so that the non-policy variables are conditioned on the current values 
of the policy instruments. Having derived the optimal policy rule, the VAR under control 
is constructed by combining the sub-system of equations for the non-policy variables that 
make up the dynamic constraint with the optimal rule. 
To illustrate analytically the PVAR approach, consider a generic reduced form VAR 
(p) model: 
zt =a+A (L) zt + et, 
where zt is aqx1 vector of endogenous variables, a is a vector of constant terms, L is the 
P 
lag operator, A (L) _ AiL', with Ai indicating aqxq matrix of lag i coefficients, et 
Z=i 
is a vector of stochastic disturbances such that E [et] =0 and E [etet] = E. To order state 
variables before control variables, the vector zt is partitioned as zt =[ zit z'2 t 
], where 
zi, t is asx1 vector of states and z2, t is acx1 vector of controls. The reduced form VAR 
can be partitioned accordingly as 
Z1, t = 
a1o + 
All (L) A12 (L) Z1, i + eft (2.46) [z2, 
tj ago 
A21 (L) A22 (L) Z2, t e2t 
' 
Ppp 
where All (L) _ A11iLZ, A12 (L) = A12iLZ, A21 (L) _ A21iLi, A22 (L) _ 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
P 
A22iLi, whereas eit and e2t are vectors of reduced form disturbances corresponding to 
Z-ý 
state and control variables respectively. The covariance matrix of the disturbances is also 
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partitioned as: 
Eis E12 
E21 EJ22 
where Ell is the sxs covariance matrix of the disturbances of the state vector, E22 is the 
cxc covariance matrix of the disturbances of the control vector, and E12 is cxs the matrix 
collecting the covariances between the disturbances of state and control vectors. 12 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), whose purpose was to identify the shocks rather than 
perform optimal control analysis, started with a structural VAR: 
Bzt =a+A (L) zt + ut, 
where the disturbances ut of the policy and non-policy instruments are assumed to 
be uncorrelated. They then consider two possible identification schemes to separate state 
and control variables: partitioning B, they set either B12 or B21 equal to zero. If the 
variables in zt are ordered non-policy and policy as before then this implies, respectively, 
that either the policy variables affect the non-policy variables with a lag or vice-versa. 
They then impose further restrictions on either B12 or B21 to compute impulse response 
functions. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) argue in favour of the restriction B12 = 0. They 
also point out that this restriction may not be suitable if the data period is so long that 
the non-policy variables have time to react to the policy instruments within the period of 
observation. The restrictions imposed by Sack, Bernanke and Blinder, and Bernanke and 
Mihov are sometimes known as partial identification of a VAR, or using a semi-structural 
VAR. Martin and Salmon (1999), who also consider optimal policy with a VAR, argue that 
12 Since E is symmetric, note that 1112 = Eil. 
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identifying a VAR through the sort of recursive restrictions used by Sack is unsatisfactory. 
Instead they use selective contemporaneous non-recursive restrictions to the disturbances. 
Under the PVAR method, a block Cholesky decomposition is applied to the parti- 
tioned vector et in order to make the reduced form disturbances in the state vector a linear 
function of the corresponding disturbances in the control vector, that is: 
el, t = Eit + Ge2, t, 
where Elt is the component of el, t which is uncorrelated with e2, t. Therefore, the vector e, t 
has the following state space representation: 
el, t IG¬ et- e2, t 0I e2, t 
The covariance matrix J can be used to construct the matrix G as follows: 
G= E12E22 1 
(2.47) 
which in turn gives the transformation matrix: 
H 1- 01 
LI 
The matrix H-1 can be employed to map the original system onto a new one 
in which 
the disturbances associated with the state variables are uncorrelated with the 
disturbances 
associated with the controls: 
H-lzt = H-ia + H-IA (L) Zt-i + H-let, 
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which in turn yields the following system of linear equations: 
Zi, t - GZ2, t = [alo - Ga20] + [A11 (L) - GA21 (L)] Zi, t-i + 
+ [A12 (L) - GA22 (L)] Z2, t-i + el, t - Ge2, t 
Since el, t - Ge2, t 
to 
Z2, t = a20 + A21 (L) zi, t-i + A22 (L) z2, t-1 + e2, t. 
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Eit - and e2, t and it are uncorrelated - the above system is equivalent 
zl, t = a10 + All (L) zi, t-i + A12 (L) z2, t-1 + Eit 
-G [a20 + A21 (L) zi, t-i - Z2, t + A22 (L) z2, t-1] 
Z2, t = a20 + A21 (L) zi, t-i + A22 (L) z2, t-1 + e2, t, 
(2.48) 
(2.49) 
with Z2, t uncorrelated with elt. Hence, under the PVAR approach the state vector zl, t is 
conditioned on the exogenous control vector Z2, t. As a result, equation (2.48) can be used 
in isolation from the rest of the system to represent the law of motion of the state vector. 
Equation (2.49) can be replaced by any other policy rule and combined with equation (2.48) 
to form a complete new model of the economy under control. If the policy rule takes the 
general form: 
Azlt + z2t = ago + A*, (L)zi, t-i + A22(L)z2t-i + e* 2 20 
then the complete model of the economy is given by: 
I -G 
11 zlt alo +I -G 
All (L) A12(L) zi, t-i fit 
AI Z2t ago 01 A21(L) A22 (L) z2, t-1 e2t 
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The above model can be written as the VAR system: 
Zit I -G a10 + 
Z2t AI a20 
+I -G 
-i I -G [A11(L) A12(L) 
iL 
Zl, t-1 AI0I A21(L) A22 (L) Z2, i-1 
+I -G 
-ý Eßt 
AI eät 
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The standard approach is as a special case of the PVAR approach, obtained by setting 
G=0 in equation (2.48). This is because G= E12E22 and the standard identification 
assumes that J12 = 0. Thus, the two identification approaches lead to quite different state 
space representation of the dynamic constraint. Under the PVAR approach the response 
of the state vector to a current change in the policy instrument is embodied in the matrix 
G, while the coefficients of the vector z2t_1 are treated as part of the state vector. Under 
the standard approach, the state space representation of the structural model ultimately 
coincides with the state equations of the reduced form VAR. 13 
It is important to assess the implications of the two approaches for the stochastic 
properties of the VAR. This is because the stochastic properties of the state vector after 
substitution of any policy rule, either optimal or sub-optimal, are crucially different under 
the two identification approaches. The expected value of zi, t from equation (2.48) is given 
by: 
E [Zi, t] = aio + All (L) Zi, t-i + A12 (L) Z2, t-1, 
I' A detailed description of the two state space representations is provided in appendix A. 
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because the term in square brackets in equation (2.48) is equal to e2t, which has zero ex- 
pected value by definition. Since E [zl, t] is equal to the deterministic part of the state vector, 
the same expected value for zl, t is obtained from the stochastic dynamic equation derived 
under the standard approach and the original VAR. Therefore, the PVAR transformation 
does not alter the stochastic properties of the state vector. However, when the vector z2, t_1 
is replaced with another policy rule, the expected values of zl, t obtained from equations 
(2.48) depends upon the value of G. Under the PVAR approach, the forecast error of the 
new system under control, obtained after substitution of a policy rule in equation (2.48), 
is given by Elt since the expected value of the term in square brackets is nonzero under 
control. In contrast, when the matrix G is forced to be equal to zero, as under the stan- 
dard approach, the substitution of the same policy rule in equation (2.48) implies that the 
forecast error is given by elt. Therefore, substitution of the optimal rule into the dynamic 
constraint computed under the standard approach reduces the volatility of the deterministic 
part of the state vector, leaving unaffected the volatility of the stochastic term. In contrast, 
under the PVAR approach, substitution of the optimal rule into the dynamic constraint has 
the effect of reducing the volatility of both the deterministic and the stochastic component 
of the state vector. 
2.3 Optimal policy with a VAR 
The optimal control of a time-separable inter-temporal quadratic objective function con- 
strained by a stochastic linear dynamic system is well known. The solution may be ob- 
tained either by using the method of dynamic programming or the method of Lagrange 
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multipliers; both techniques lead to the same solution. 14 When dynamic programming is 
used the problem is commonly referred to as linear quadratic dynamic programming. We 
wish to compare the optimal solution based on the PVAR method with that based on the 
standard method using a VAR. We therefore derive the solutions for the policy variables Z2t 
for the case where the dynamic constraint determining the non-policy variables zlt is the 
conditional VAR in equation (2.48), and for the case where the equations for zit are those 
in the reduced form VAR, equation (2.46). 
In general, the quadratic loss function of the policy maker can be written as: 
00 
Lt = Et 
E ßS [(Yt+3-Y)' W (Yt+s-Y)] 
, (2.50) 
s=o 
where Et denotes mathematical expectations conditioned on time t information, yt+3 
I zit+s """ zit+s-p z2t+s """ Z2t+s-p 
]', zl is a vector of endogenous variables, z2 is 
a vector of policy instruments, y is a target vector and W is a symmetric positive semidef- 
finite matrix of policy weights. " 
The value function V (yt), i. e. the minimum value at time t of the welfare loss under 
the infinite sequence of controls {z2t+s}s0 o, is given by: 
00 
V (Yt) = min Et 
> ßt [(Yt+s-Y)'W (Yt+s-Y)] 
{z2t+s 
s-o s=0 
Since L is a quadratic form in yt+s-y, the general structure of the value function can 
be guessed to be a linear combination of a quadratic, a linear and a constant term and 
represented as: 
' An accurate comparison of the use of dynamic programming and Lagrange multipliers tecniques for the 
assessment of optimal policy rules can be found in Chow (1976). 
15 The vector yt can include current and lagged values of both state and instrument variables. The rep- 
resentation of equation (2.50) is sufficiently general to eventually include first differences of the objective 
function's arguments by imposing ad hoc identities in the off-diagonal elements of the matrix W. 
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V (Yt) = yPyt - 2Ytp + d, (2.51) 
where P is a positive semidefinite symmetric matrix of coefficients having the same order 
of W, whereas p and d are vectors of coefficients compatible with yt. The Bellman (1957) 
principle can then be applied to write the value function in the recursive form 
V (Yt) = min (Yt-Y)ý W (Yt-Y) + fEt [V (Yt+i)] (2.52) {z2t+s}s=o 
and substitution of the expression in (2.51) into the value function of equation (2.52) gives 
the following recursive Bellman (1957) equation: 
ytPyt - 2ytp +d= min {z2t+s}3.0 
2.3.1 Standard approach 
(2.53) 
The dynamic constraint in the standard approach is based on the sub-system of equations 
for zlt in the original VAR, equation (2.46). In state-space (companion) form it can be 
re-written as: 
Yt+i =c+ Cyt + Dz2t + Vt+i, (2.54) 
where vt+l = et+l and Et [vt+iz2t] = 0. Maximising the value function (2.53) 
subject to (2.54) gives the optimal rule, see Sack(2000) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). 
(Yt-Y)'W (Yt-Y) + fEt [Yt+1PYt+l - 2Yi+lP + d] . 
The optimal solution is given by: 
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Z2t =f+ FYt, (2.55) 
f=- (D'PD) -1 D' (Pc - p) , 
1 
F=- (D'PD) D'PC. 
where P is calculated from the stable solution to the recursive algebraic matrix Riccati 
equation: 
Pt+1= W+ßC'PtC-ßC'PtD (D'D)' D'PtC, 
while the vector p is computed from: 
r1 -1 
P= LI -ß 
(C + DP)'] 
ýWy 
-Q 
(C + DF) Pc] . 
16 
Hence, in the standard method, equation (2.55), the policy instrument responds con- 
temporaneously to yt. The matrix Riccati equation is non-linear but satisfies a fixed-point 
theorem, the solution for P must be therefore be obtained through numerical iteration. 
Substituting (2.55) into (2.54) gives the state-space representation 
Yt+i =q+ QYt + vt+i, (2.56) 
where q=c+ Df and Q=C+ DE. Equations (2.56) represents the VAR under control, 
which gives the behaviour of the state vector on the implicit assumption that the policy 
instruments have always been generated by the above policy rule, and there has been no 
switch of policy. 
The expected loss under the standard approach may be evaluated as: 
16 See, for example, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), p. 1012-1014. 
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00 00 
Lt = 
1: 03 [(Etyt+3-Y)' W (Ety +s-Y)] +E QstrWrs, (2.57) 
s-o s-o 
where 
Fs = Et [(Yt+s-EtYt+3) (Yt+s-EtYt+s)i] J 
= (I+Q+... ß-Q3-l)S (I+Q+... +Qs-l )/ 
=Qf Q' + 
where I'0 -- 0 and Evtvt = Q. Thus I'3 is is the conditional covariance matrix of 
Yt+s given information at time t. Equation (2.57) shows that the expected welfare cost can 
be decomposed into two parts. The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.57) is the 
deterministic component of the welfare cost and measures the cost due to the unconditional 
expectation of the vector yt being different from the long run target. The second term is the 
stochastic component of the welfare cost, which depends upon the volatility of the vector 
yt+s. In particular, If, measures the volatility of the forecast error due to the presence of 
the disturbances eit+s, which cause deviations of yt+s from its expected path. 
2.3.2 PVAR method 
In the PVAR approach the dynamic constraint is based on equation (2.48). In state-space 
form it can be re-written as: 
yt+l =a+ Ayt + BZ2t+l + Ut+l (2.58) 
where ut+l = ct+l and Et [ut+lz2t+1] = 0. Maximisation of (2.53) subject to (2.58) 
gives the optimal rule: 
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Z2t =f+ FYt-1, (2.59) 
f= -(B'PB)-1B'(Pa-p), 
F=- (B'PB)-1 B'PA. " 
where P is the solution to the time-invariant Riccati equation: 
Pt+1= W+ßA'PtA-ß2A'PtB (B'PtB)-1 B'PtA 
and the vector p can be calculated from: 
p= ýI-, Q(A+BF)']-' [Wy-ß(A-+-BF)'Pa] . 
This solution differs from that of Chow (1976), pp. 156-160 and 176-178 due to the pres- 
ence of the discount factor. The loss function, equation (2.50), differs from Chow's which 
replaces ß8W by the more general W3. As for the previous case, the Riccati equation 
is highly nonlinear and it can only be solved numerically, for example, by setting initial 
values Pt-- 0 and iterating until convergence into the stable value Pt= Pt+i = P. 
The behaviour of the state vector under control is usually expressed in state-space 
form, which is obtained by substituting the optimal rule (2.59) into equation (2.58) to give: 
Yt+i =r+ RYt + ut+i, (2.60) 
where rt =a+ Bf and R=A+ BF. 
The loss function, equation (2.50), may be evaluated under control by re-writing it 
as: 
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00 00 
Lt =E [(Etyt+3-y)'W (Etyt+3-Y)] + ß8trWI's, 
8=0 s=0 
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where I's now measures the volatility of the forecast error due to the presence of random 
disturbances Et+s which cause deviations of yt+s from its expected path. I's may be ob- 
tained from equation (1). Denoting Eutut =1 then, as ut+s has a constant variance, 
I'3 = Et (Yt+3-EtYt+s) (Yt+s-EtYt+s)/] J 
_ (I+R+... +Rs-1)Q (I+R+... +Rs-1) ' 
= Rr3-, R' +c 
where I'o = 0. 
To summarise, if the original VAR disturbances are correlated, then the PVAR method 
should be followed instead of the standard approach which assumes that they are uncorre- 
lated, and hence that G=0. The PVAR approach has the further advantage of yielding 
a semi-strucural VAR in which state variables respond to current and lagged values of the 
control, rather than only lagged values of the control as in the standard methodology. In 
this respect, the PVAR approach does not impose any timing restriction on the dynamic of 
state and control variables in the state space representation of the economy. One could ar- 
gue that the drawback of the PVAR approach is that it yields optimal policy rules in which 
the control vector responds with a lag to changes in the state variables, equation (2.55), 
whereas the standard identification approach yields a policy rule in which the control vec- 
tor responds to current changes in the state variables, equation (2.59). However, this result 
is not related to the identification approach but rather to the technique adopted for the com- 
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putation of the optimal rule, i. e. dynamic programming. In fact, one could specify - under 
both identification approaches -a policy rule with a dynamic structure entirely unrestricted: 
Azlt + z2t = ago + Ali(L)zi, t-i + A22(C)zar-i, 
and then grid search through the parameters to maximise the objective function in equation 
(2.50). Within this optimisation framework, the optimal policy rule computed under the 
PVAR approach includes feedback to both current and lagged values of the state vector. 
2.4 Computing optimal monetary policy rules 
Inflation targeting policies carried out in western countries over the last 15 years consist 
in changing the monetary policy instruments, mainly the short term interest rate, in order 
to achieve either explicit or implicit medium term inflation targets. As a consequence, the 
literature on the computation of optimal monetary policy rules usually describes central 
banks' preferences through ad hoc discounted quadratic loss functions embodying con- 
trol over a linear weighted combination of inflation, output and changes in the short term 
interest rate, that is: 
00 
L= Et E ßt+s [\ (71t+s _ 7r)2 + )\yy 
+s + AorsOrst+sý (2.61) 
s-o 
where 7rt is the rate of inflation, yt is the output gap, rst is the nominal short-term interest 
rate controlled by the central bank, )=1 is the policy weight attached to inflation, while 
A. and Hors measure the policy weights attached to y and Ors relatively to inflation. The 
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term Orst, which measures the first-difference in the instrument rate, reflects the cost 
attached to changes in policy and it is referred to as interest rate smoothing term. 18 
The loss function is minimised with respect to the intertemporal sequence of inter- 
est rates {rst+s}s° o and a stochastic linear model representing the dynamic structure of the 
economy. Although the central bank targets only output and inflation, the optimal feedback 
rule has to embody responses to actions of any other decision maker that can contribute to 
the determination of output and inflation, either directly or indirectly. In macroeconomic 
analyses, the two main candidates are the fiscal authorities and the private sector. Fiscal 
authorities play a key role in smoothing the path of the nominal economy, mainly by set- 
ting the automatic stabilisers and, in principle, the response of the central bank to short-run 
fluctuations of real output and prices should be negatively correlated with the strength of 
the automatic stabilisers. " The private sector reacts to monetary policy actions by chang- 
ing short and long term spending decisions, as captured by the term structure of the interest 
rates. The transmission mechanism is completed by the link between the fiscal and the pri- 
vate sector, as reflected by the correlation between the budget deficit and the long-run real 
interest rate. 2° Therefore, the optimal feedback rule of an inflation targeting central bank 
has to include feedback not only to changes in output and inflation, but also to adjustments 
in government's spending and financing decisions and in the term structure of the interest 
rates. 
18 For a critical review of the optimal monetary policy literature, see Svensson (2003). 
19 For a detailed discussion, see Taylor (1995,2000). 
20 Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) discuss theoretical arguments in support of this transmission channel 
and provide empirical evidence of a positive and statistically significant effect of the 
budget surplus on the 
interest rate. 
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In light of this discussion, optimal monetary policy rules are computed by specifying 
a VAR model of the U. S. economy in which the endogenous vector zt includes: 
Rt Yt art rlt rst ], t yt yt yt 
where yt is the net liability-to-GDP ratio, is the government net expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio, y1 is the government revenue-to-GDP ratio, Rt is the effective interest rate on net 
government liabilities, yt is the output gap, 7rt is the rate of inflation, rlt is the nominal 
long-term interest rate and rst is the nominal short-term interest rate. 21 
Given the specification of the objective function in equation (2.61), the first seven 
variables in zt are non-policy variables, whereas the only policy instrument is rst. Note 
that yt and art are directly targeted by the central bank, whereas the other non-policy vari- 
ables contribute to the specification of the transmission mechanism. In fact, the first four 
variables in zt capture the response of the fiscal sector to monetary and non-monetary 
policy actions, while r1 addresses adjustments in the term structure of the interest rates 
following monetary policy actions. 
The empirical assessment employs annual data for the period 1960 to 2005, which 
are plotted in Figure 2.1.22 The VAR model is estimated by selecting a lag dimension of 2, 
as this is the minimum number of lags required to produce serially uncorrelated residuals 
in all equations of the system. To check the structural stability of the VAR I computed re- 
21 Specifically, b refers to the consolidated gross financial liabilities of the government sector net of short 
term financial assets, such as cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector, etc.; rs refers to interest rates on 
the three-month deposits; and rl refers to the ten-year government bond yield. The measures of y, 
y, y and 
R are consistent with the government budget constraint and it is calculated as the rate of change in the GDP 
deflator. 
22 The OECD Economic Outlook is the source of all data except for the output gap series, taken from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' database. 
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cursive Chow tests, but with one marginal exception none were significant. I also examined 
recursive estimates of the VAR coefficients. These showed little variation beyond the ini- 
tial start-up observations, hence supporting Rudebusch's (2002) conclusion that a monetary 
policy VAR for the US does not display much evidence of the sort of structural instability 
predicted by the Lucas Critique. 
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), optimal interest rate rules are computed 
under five alternative specifications of the objective function, obtained by varying the rela- 
tive weights Ay and AA,, and summarised in table 2.1. The first objective function sets the 
benchmark case, which assumes output having the same weight of inflation and the interest 
rate smoothing term having a weight of 0.5. Objective functions 2 and 3 look at the con- 
sequences of having a policy weight attached to output which is 5 times respectively lower 
or higher than that of inflation. Specifications 4 and 5 consider the effect of varying the 
policy weight attached to Ors, by setting A, = AY= 1 and AA,, either equal to one or to 
one-tenth of A, r. 
Optimal policy rules are assessed under both the PVAR and the standard approach, 
and the state space representations of the dynamic constraint under the two identification 
approaches are reported in appendix A. Finally, the target vector y is assumed to correspond 
with the expected value of the variables included in y, measured from the average sample 
value of the state vector. Therefore, the computation of the welfare cost function in this 
paper takes only into account the stochastic component of equation (?? ). 
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2.5 Empirical results 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is threefold. First, the predicted volatility of policy 
instruments is assessed under the PVAR and standard approach for alternative specifications 
of the objective function. Next, the performances of policy rules computed from both 
approaches are evaluated by comparing their implied welfare costs. Finally, sensitiveness 
analysis is carried out to appraise the impact of alternative choices of policy weights on 
the results, by examining the welfare effects of gradually switching the policy focus from 
inflation to output stabilisation. All results are reported in appendix B. 
Figure 2.2 plots optimal interest rates computed from both the PVAR and the stan- 
dard approach under the five specifications of the objective function described in table 2.1. 
Each panel in the figure includes the optimal policy instrument computed under both ap- 
proaches for a specific set of policy weights, as well as the interest rate predicted from the 
reaction function estimated in the original VAR model. For all specifications of the ob- 
jective function, the optimal policy instrument computed under the standard approach is 
closer to the VAR interest rate than that computed under the PVAR approach. In the latter 
case, evidence of a much larger gap is observed in the first half of the 1960s and from the 
second half of the 1970s to the first half of the 1980s. In addition, feedback rules computed 
from the PVAR approach seem to deliver smoother interest rates than those measured from 
the standard approach. 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of the series in figure 2.2, namely the standard 
deviation (SD) of each interest rate and the average absolute distance (AAD) of each op- 
timal rate from the VAR interest rate. The former statistics measure the overall volatility 
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of the policy instrument under a specific feedback rule, whereas the latter compute the dif- 
ference between the optimal and the VAR reaction functions. The statistics are calculated 
over the whole sample period (1960-2006), as well as the first (1960-1983) and second half 
(1984-2006). Two main patterns emerge from the table. First, the PVAR approach tends to 
deliver policy rules less reactive to changes in the state variables than predicted by the stan- 
dard approach. Standard deviations of optimal rates predicted from the PVAR approach 
are consistently smaller than those predicted from the standard approach under all specifi- 
cations of the objective function. 23 Second, the statistics confirm that optimal interest rate 
rules measured under the standard approach are closer to the VAR reaction function than 
those derived from the PVAR approach. The AADs for the whole sample and the first-half 
sub-sample are lower when calculated from the PVAR than the standard approach under all 
specifications of the objective function. This pattern is reversed during the second half of 
the sample when the AADs of rules computed from the PVAR approach are lower than the 
corresponding statistics from the standard approach. However, comparison of the average 
AADs for the five objective functions shows that the statistic is fairly stable between the 
two sub-samples under the standard approach, while the reversion of the pattern in the sec- 
and half of the sample is caused by the reduction of the AAD under the PVAR approach in 
that period. 
Figure 2.3 plots 20-periods ahead forecasts of output and inflation calculated after 
substitution of each optimal rule into the corresponding dynamic constraint. Panel 3. a 
includes forecasts for rules computed under objective functions 1,2 and 3, whereas panel 
23 The only exception is for optimal policy rates computed under objective function 3 in the second half of 
the sample, which display similar volatility under both approaches. 
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3. b displays forecasts obtained under objective functions 4 and 5. Each panel also includes 
output and inflation forecasts obtained from the original VAR and the policy targets. The 
figure shows that output and inflation stabilisation occurs more rapidly under the PVAR 
than the standard approach. Output forecasts under the PVAR approach are smoother and 
converge faster towards the target, while under the standard approach they have in the 
first quarter of the forecasting horizon a hump-shape for all specifications of the objective 
function. Inflation forecasts also appear to be less volatile when computed from the PVAR 
approach. As for the case of output, inflation forecasts under the standard approach are 
particularly volatile during the first 5 periods, before converging towards the target at a 
smoother pace. 
The above predictions, together with those of the interest rate smoothing term, are 
employed to measure welfare losses as in equation (2.61) for the five specifications of the 
objective function. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the calculated total welfare costs, as well as 
- to appraise the contribution of each component of the welfare 
function - standard devi- 
ations of forecasts of y, it and Ars. Each table also displays standard deviations of the 
forecasts of the three policy variables obtained from the original VAR model, and both un- 
weighted and weighted welfare costs measured under the PVAR and the standard approach. 
In particular, table 2.3 shows welfare costs computed by using undiscounted 
forecasts, i. e. 
,Q=1, whereas table 
2.4 repeats the analysis by using /3 = 1/ (1 - p), where p is equal 
to the corresponding sample average of 5.42 per cent. As observed 
for figure 3, output and 
inflation forecasts obtained from the PVAR approach are less volatile than the correspond- 
ing predictions from the standard approach. Under the PVAR approach output volatility 
is 
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reduced, on average, by about 50 per cent and inflation volatility by about 40 per cent. Un- 
der the standard approach the average reduction in output and inflation volatility is of about 
20 and 10 per cent, respectively. Consequently, the overall loss under the PVAR approach 
is lower than that calculated under the standard approach, for all specifications of the ob- 
jective function. Discounting has the effect of smoothing the expected standard deviations 
over the horizon period, leaving unchanged the relative differences between the outcomes 
of the two identification techniques and the alternative specifications of the objective func- 
tion. 
The final part of the empirical assessment looked at the sensitiveness of welfare mea- 
surement to alternative policy actions. In particular, the sensitiveness analysis is carried 
out by solving the dynamic optimisation problem and computing the welfare cost itera- 
tively 990 times, for A ranging from 0.1 to 10. Since )= 1/)y, any increase in the 
policy weight attached to the standard deviation of output corresponds to a proportional 
decrease in the policy weight attached to the standard deviation of inflation. The first step 
of the iteration, Ay = 0.1 and A, = 10, approximates a strict inflation targeting policy, 
whereas the last step, Ay = 10 and )=0.1, simulates a strict output targeting regime. 
Therefore, the key purpose of the analysis is to unfold the change in the welfare cost due 
to the gradual switch of the policy focus from inflation to output stabilisation. 
To evaluate the contribution of each component of the welfare cost function as the 
policy weight attached to output volatility relative to inflation volatility increases, figure 2.4 
plots changes in the standard deviation of y, 7 and Ors under the PVAR approach while 
Ay ranges from 0.1 to 10. The figure includes three panels as the computation is carried 
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out by fixing AA,, respectively at 0.1,0.5 and 1. At the beginning of the iteration marginal 
increases of Ay augment the volatility of both y and 7, while reducing the volatility of Ors. 
These patterns, more evident in the panel corresponding to Ors = 1, quickly fade away 
and output volatility begins to decline, while Ors volatility starts to rise, as Ay increases. 
Inflation volatility decreases considerably in each panel up until Ay reaches 3.89,3.57 and 
4.44 - for Ars respectively equal to 0.1,0.5 and 1- before slowly rising until the end 
of the iteration. 24 Therefore, when Ay is low, increasing the weight attached to output 
relative to inflation reduces both output and inflation volatility. However, there is a critical 
combination of policy weights after which a further increase in Ay reduces the volatility of 
output at the cost of a higher volatility in inflation. 
Figure 2.5 repeats the previous analysis for the standard approach. At each level of 
RATS, output volatility monotonously decreases while Ay rises. Inflation volatility declines 
to reach minimum values when Ay is equal to 2.60 for Ars = 0.1, to 4.16 for RATS = 0.5 
and to 5.24 for AA, = 1.25 Similarly to inflation, the volatility of Ors decreases at the 
beginning of the iteration and begins to increase as soon as Ay reaches, respectively in each 
panel, 2.21,2.85 and 3.21 . 
2' The declining pattern in output volatility is similar across 
the three panels, while the volatility of inflation is more heterogeneous, indicating that 
under the standard approach inflation stabilisation is more sensitive to the choice of AA,, 
than output stabilisation. Comparison of figures 2.4 and 2.5 clearly shows that both levels 
2' The volatility of inflation reaches the minimum values of respectively 0.46,0.41 and 0.39. The corre- 
sponding values of A, are respectively 0.26,0.28 and 0.23. 
25 The minimum value of inflation volatility at each of the three levels of Ate,.,, is 0.90,0.78 and 0.72. The 
corresponding A, 's are 0.38,0.24 and 0.19 respectively. 
26 The minimum standard deviation of the interest rate smoothing term, at each level of AA,.,., is 0.36,0.31 
and 0.29, reached at ) respectively equal 0.45,0.35 and 0.31. 
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and changes in the volatility of output, inflation and the interest rate smoothing term, with 
respect to Ay, are lower under the PVAR than the standard approach. 
Figure 2.6 plots the change in the total welfare loss for alternative choices of Ay 
under the PVAR and standard approach to appraise the sensitiveness of the total welfare 
cost to different values of the policy weights. The figure essentially confirms the evidence 
arising from the previous two graphs, since the total welfare loss computed under the PVAR 
approach is lower than that computed under the standard approach, at any combination 
of the policy weights. The figure shows that in general the total welfare cost declines 
during the first quarter of the iteration and increases afterwards. In the first quarter of 
the iteration, the patterns observed for the PVAR approach suggest that the reduction in 
output and inflation volatility dominates the increase in volatility coming from Ors. This 
pattern is reversed after the first quarter because the decrease in output volatility is more 
than compensated by the increase in the volatility of the other two variables. Under the 
standard approach the initial reduction in the total welfare loss is due to the simultaneous 
reduction in the volatility of all targeted variables during the first quarter of the iteration. 
This pattern is reversed afterwards because, as under the PVAR approach, the fall in output 
volatility is more than compensated by the increase in volatility of the other two variables. 
Figure 2.6 also shows that the total loss has a unique local minimum value which varies 
between the two identification approaches and considerably depends upon the choice of Ay 
and Hors. In particular, visual inspection suggests that the larger AA, the higher the value 
of Ay corresponding to the minimum welfare cost. 
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Table 2.5 presents summary statistics of the total welfare series plotted in figure 2.6. 
The table reports the minimum and the maximum values of the welfare cost, the corre- 
sponding policy weights, the average and the standard deviation of each series. Under the 
PVAR approach, the minimum value of the welfare cost decreases as AA, increases, rang- 
ing from 1.86 per cent when AA, = 0.1 to 1.58 per cent when AA, = 1. In general, the 
total welfare cost is fairly stable across different values of RATS, being on average about 
1.80 per cent with standard deviation of about 5.5 to 6 per cent. Also under the standard 
approach the minimum value of the welfare cost decreases as A rs increase, even though 
minimum values are higher than those computed for the PVAR approach, ranging from 
2.15 per cent when AA, = 0.1 to 1.75 per cent when AA, = 1. In addition, the average 
loss for the three values of AA,, is larger - about 2.20 per cent - and considerably more 
sensitive to variations in the policy weights - standard deviation of about 30 per cent - than 
that computed under the PVAR approach. 
Figure 2.7 plots the efficiency frontier for the feasible combinations of standard de- 
viations in output and inflation achievable by the optimal policy rules under the PVAR and 
the standard approach, while increasing Ay from 0.1 to 10 and for values of Hors equal to 
either 0.1 or 0.5 or 1. The shape of all efficiency frontiers plotted in the three panels ul- 
timately reflects the patterns outlined in figures 4 and 5 for output and inflation volatility. 
The span of the frontier is smaller under the PVAR than the standard approach, regard- 
less of the policy weight attached to the interest smoothing term. Each frontier shows that 
when the volatility of output is high, changes in the policy rules resulting from an increase 
in Ay have the effect of reducing inflation, as well as output, volatility. Output volatility 
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reaches a critical value, around 0.5 per cent under the PVAR approach and 0.8 per cent un- 
der the standard approach, after which any further increase in Ay requires inflation to be 
more volatile. 
Table 2.6 presents summary statistics of the efficiency frontiers plotted in figure 2.7, 
focusing, in particular, on the portions of the frontiers displaying the trade-off between 
output and inflation. The table shows that the length and the shape of the trade-off area 
varies considerably between the two identification approaches. Under the PVAR approach 
the trade-off area on the efficiency frontier covers almost 60 per cent of the iterations and 
it is considerably stable across the three values of Ars. On average, the trade-off begins 
when the policy weight attached to inflation volatility declines to about a quarter of that 
attached to output volatility. The net welfare gain (NWG) from increasing Ay, calculated 
as the difference between the welfare gain from the reduction in output volatility and the 
welfare cost from the increase in inflation volatility, is rather negligible, as it is almost 
zero when Hors = 0.1, and 0.01 or 0.02 per cent when Hors equals either 0.5 or 1. Under 
the standard approach, the length of the trade-off area on the efficiency frontier is more 
sensitive to the values AA, covering about either 75 or 60 or 50 per cent of the frontier 
when AA, is equal to respectively 0.1,0.5 and 1.27 Finally, the net welfare change is larger 
than that predicted under the PVAR approach and negative for all three values of AA,,. 
27 The trade-off starts when ) declines respectively to about 0.4,0.25 and 0.2. 
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This paper suggests a way of formulating optimal policy based on a VAR that avoids many 
of the problems found in the standard approach. For example, and perhaps the most impor- 
tant advantage, the PVAR method yields a dynamic structural representation of the econ- 
omy in which state variables are conditioned upon current and lagged values of the policy 
instruments rather than lagged values alone, as under the standard method. This state space 
representation is more suitable in macroeconomic policy analysis since output and prices 
respond within the periods of observation to a change in policy even when observed in a 
monthly basis. 
Since the whole process is easily automated, the PVAR method may provide a useful 
benchmark for use in real time against which to compare other, probably far more labour 
intensive, policy choices. Although basing optimal policy on a VAR has the merit of sim- 
plicity, it is not without its drawbacks. The paper shows that as a result of implementing 
optimal policy, the VAR under control is different from the original VAR. This is not nec- 
essarily a problem in itself, but it does draw attention to the fact that any previous changes 
of policy are likely to have caused structural change in the original VAR. This shows the 
vulnerability - at least in theory - of any VAR to structural change. The problem is further 
exacerbated because the VAR is just a particular time series representation of a structural 
model. If the parameters of the structural model alter as a result of policy changes, then 
we would expect the VAR coefficients to change too. In practice, like Rudebusch (2002), 
we find little evidence of structural change in the dynamics of a VAR suitable for analysing 
monetary policy for the US. 
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Another drawback of using a VAR is that it is not suitable for handling the effects 
on non-policy variables of anticipated policy changes. One cannot avoid using a structural 
rational expectations model if one wishes to analyse this problem. To avoid any misappre- 
hensions, therefore, we emphasise that in arguing the merits of adopting the PVAR method 
for formulating policy based on a VAR, we are not suggesting that using a VAR is neces- 
sarily preferable to using a well specified structural model. 
The PVAR method is compared empirically with the standard methodology by analysing 
monetary policy for the US since 1960 under different specifications of the welfare func- 
tion. The results suggest that the path of the interest rate obtained using the PVAR method 
would have been smoother than that obtained under the standard approach. This suggests 
that the excess of volatility typically found in studies on optimal US monetary policy un- 
der the standard approach (Sack (2000)) can be also imputed to the misspecification of the 
forecasting model employed by the policy maker, as well as the uncertainty surrounding 
the precise values of the model's parameters. 
Chapter 3 
Measuring the fiscal stance 
In this paper we propose an index of the fiscal stance suitable for practical use in 
short-term policy making. The index is based on a comparison of a target level of the 
debt-GDP ratio for a given finite horizon with a forecast of the debt-GDP ratio based on a 
VAR formed from the government budget constraint. This approach to measuring the fiscal 
stance is different from the literature on fiscal sustainability. We emphasise the importance 
of having a forward-looking measure of the fiscal stance for the immediate future rather 
than a test for fiscal sustainability that is backward-looking, or based just on past behav- 
four which may not be closely related to the current fiscal position. We also describe a 
bootstrapping methodology that can be easily implemented to attach confidence bands to 
the index in order to evaluate the statistical significance of the policy prescriptions arising 
from the empirical computation of the index. We use our methodology to construct a time 
series of the indices of the fiscal stances of the US, the UK and Germany over the last 25 or 
more years. We find that both the US and UK fiscal stances have deteriorated considerably 
since 2000 and Germany's has been steadily deteriorating since unification in 1989, and 
worsened again on joining EMU. Out-of-sample projections of the index also show that the 
fiscal stance is expected to improve in the United States and the United Kingdom, while 
further worsening in Germany. 
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Recent concerns in 2004 and 2005 about the fiscal stances of the US, France and Germany 
and of possible reforms to the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (largely due to the errant fis- 
cal positions of France and Germany) have renewed interest in the issue of how to measure 
the fiscal stance. In this paper we propose an index of the fiscal stance suitable for practi- 
cal use in short-term policy making. We take a very different approach from the literature 
on fiscal sustainability even though, like this literature, it is based on the government inter- 
temporal budget constraint. We emphasise the importance of having a forward-looking 
measure of the fiscal stance that focuses on the implications of the current fiscal stance 
for the immediate future. We argue against focusing on formal tests of the stationarity of 
debts and deficits as they are backward-looking and not necessarily a good guide to the 
current stance of fiscal policy. The index is based on a comparison of a target level of the 
debt-GDP ratio for a given finite horizon with a forecast of the debt-GDP ratio based on a 
VAR formed from the government budget constraint. By using a VAR forecasting model 
we avoid basing the index on a particular theoretical model of the economy, and the index 
is simple to compute and readily automated. We use our methodology to examine the fiscal 
stances of the US, the UK and Germany over the last 25 or more years. We find that both 
the US and UK fiscal stances have deteriorated considerably since 2000 and Germany's has 
been steadily deteriorating since unification in 1989 and worsened again on joining EMU. 
The index can also be employed to forecast the fiscal stance over the short run. Our result 
show that the fiscal stance is expected to improve in the US and the UK, but not in Ger- 
many. The emphasis on the fiscal stance, as opposed to fiscal sustainability, is a key feature 
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of this paper. Determining whether the current fiscal stance is sustainable has proved diffi- 
cult and controversial, and has limited applicability in evaluating fiscal policy in the short 
run. Typically, tests for fiscal sustainability focus on the dynamic properties of past debts 
and deficits and assume that these processes will continue into the infinite future with a 
view to establishing whether the present value of future primary surpluses are sufficient to 
meet current government debt obligations. There are obvious problems with this approach. 
First, a failure to satisfy a test for fiscal sustainability does not necessarily have any im- 
plications for the current fiscal stance. A government could argue that fiscal sustainability 
can be achieved by changing future fiscal policy so that sufficient surpluses would be gen- 
erated. Or, it may be that rejection of fiscal sustainability was due to past fiscal policy and 
that subsequent changes had removed the problem. In both cases, the time series properties 
of past debts and deficits would no longer be relevant for current policy. Second, a failure 
to satisfy a test for fiscal sustainability has little immediate relevance if financial markets 
are still willing to hold government debt, perhaps in the belief that governments will make 
the appropriate changes to fiscal policy in the future. Third, a test statistic is not a user- 
friendly way of representing fiscal policy. Something more transparent is required such as 
an index series that can capture changes in the fiscal stance over time. Fourth, in the re- 
lated literature on inter-temporal current account sustainability, the outcome of the test for 
sustainability depends on whether consumption is modelled correctly. We seek a measure 
of the fiscal stance based on the government constraint that is theory free. Although the 
outcome of tests for fiscal sustainability have not played much of a role in discussions on 
fiscal policy, a measure of the current fiscal stance would still be helpful. Such a measure 
3.1 Introduction 96 
should be easy to represent and compute and not depend on a particular theoretical model 
of the economy. Governments need to know the likely consequences of their current fiscal 
stance for their debt obligations and the costs of borrowing and of servicing the debt. Mar- 
kets need to know the risks associated with the fiscal stance in order to price government 
debt. The Maastricht Treaty was an attempt to ensure that fiscal policy was set appropri- 
ately in the run-up to EMU so that the temptation to inflate away debts was avoided. Its 
successor, the Stability and Growth Pact, seeks to avoid fiscal spillovers from one country 
to another which might affect monetary policy or euro-debt obligations. It is increasingly 
recognised, however, that such fiscal rules are neither necessary nor sufficient. Whatever 
the fiscal framework, a crucial ingredient is an appropriate measure of the current fiscal 
stance. The index we propose is concerned with forecasting whether the debt-GDP ratio 
is likely to exceed or fall below a pre-specified target over a pre-specified time horizon. 
Given the time horizon and the target level of the debt-GDP ratio at the end of that horizon, 
the index is based on a comparison of the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio and a fore- 
cast of the present value of the current level of the debt-GDP ratio over the horizon derived 
from a simple VAR forecasting model of the economy. If the index exceeds unity then the 
current fiscal stance is said to be inconsistent with the debt objective over the horizon in 
the sense that debt is forecast to rise above target; if the index is less than unity then the fis- 
cal stance is said to be consistent with the debt objective. The choice of a VAR model is to 
avoid taking a particular view of the economy and to permit the method to be easily auto- 
mated. The VAR is based on a log-linear approximation to the government's inter-temporal 
budget constraint in order that interest rates, inflation and growth are allowed to be time 
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varying. This approach is in contrast to much of the literature on fiscal sustainability where 
interest rates, inflation and growth are held constant over the forecast horizon in order to 
eliminate the non-linearities that their time variation would introduce into the intertempo- 
ral budget constraint. The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we examine a number 
of different ways of writing the government budget constraint and establish our notation. 
In Section 3 we present an analysis of fiscal sustainability with a view to showing its lim- 
itations in providing a useful measure of the current fiscal stance. We provide an intuitive 
rationale for the various tests for fiscal sustainability that have been proposed in the litera- 
ture and discuss the technical problems in implementing these tests. We also comment on 
the implications of this analysis of fiscal sustainability for the debt and deficit limits of the 
EU's Stability and Growth Pact. In section 4 we describe how, by using a log-linear ap- 
proximation to the government budget constraint we can derive our proposed fiscal index 
and show how it can implemented using VAR analysis. In Section 5 we calculate the index 
for the US, the UK and Germany over the period from the 1970's to 2005. Section 6 shows 
further implications of the index for policy analysis. In particular, we describe a bootstrap- 
ping methodology that can be easily implemented to construct confidence bands for the 
index of the fiscal stance. We also suggest that projections of the index over the future pro- 
vide useful insights about the evolution and implication of fiscal policy in the medium run. 
Our findings are summarized in Section 7. 
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We begin by considering the nominal government budget constraint (GBC), the sustainabil- 
ity of fiscal policy and the implications of various fiscal rules, such as the EU's Stability 
and Growth Pact. 28 The nominal GBC can be written 
Ptgt + (1 + Rt)Bt_1 = Bt + OMt + PtTt (3.62) 
where gt is real government expenditure including real transfers to households, Tt is total 
real taxes and Mt is the stock of outside nominal, non-interest bearing money in circulation 
that is supplied by the government (the central bank) at the start of period t, Bt is the 
nominal value of government bonds issued at the end of period t, Rt is the average interest 
rate on bonds issued at the end of period t-1 and RtBt_1 is total interest payments made 
in period t. 29 Thus the left-hand side of equation (3.62) is total nominal expenditures in 
period t and the right-hand side is total revenues plus additions to government current 
financial resources. 
The equivalent real GBC can be derived from the nominal GBC by dividing through 
the nominal GBC by the general price level Pt. This gives 
Pc-, Bt-, 
__ Tt 
Mt 
_ 
Pt-l Mt-l 
9t+(1+Rt) Pt Pt-i t+ Pt + pt Pt Pt- 
28 There is a substantial literature on these issues. Most of it goes back some way in time. See, for example, 
I lamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988,1991), Kremers (1989), Wilcox (1989), Blanchard et 
al (1990), Bohn (1992,1995,1998,2005), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Buiter et al (1993), Ahmed and Rogers 
(1995) and Wickens and Uctum (2000). There is also a related literature on current account sustainabilit\. 
see Wickens and Uctum (1993). 
29 In practice governments issue bonds at a discount and redeem them at par. Thus if all bonds were for one 
period, then B, = P1'3B, ' where B(' is the number of bonds issued in period t each with price Ptß = l+Ht+l 
and B, _1 = (1 + R, )Bt, -1. 
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or 
9t+ (l+rt)bt-i =Tt+bt+mt- 11 Mt-i 
(3.63) 
+t 
where art =° Pl is the rate of inflation, bt is the real stock of government debt, mt is the 
real stock of money and rt is the real rate of interest defined by 
l+rt _ 
1+Rt 
1+7rt 
and implying that approximately rt ^- Rt - 7rt. 
The GBC can also be expressed in terms of proportions of nominal or real GDP by 
dividing through the nominal GBC by nominal GDP Ptyt, where yt is real GDP. We obtain 
9t 1+ Rt bt-, 7t bt Mt 1 ant-i 
-+ +-+- (3.64) yt (l+-Ft)(1+'Yt)yt-i Yt Yt Yt (1+7rt)(1+7t) Yt-i 
where ryt is the rate of growth of GDP and yl is the average tax rate. 
The total nominal government deficit (or public sector borrowing requirement, PSBR) 
is defined as 
PtDt = Ptgt + RtBt-i - PtTt - OMt 
hence D' 
, the real government 
deficit as a proportion of GDP is 
Dt 
_ 
9t + 
Rt bt-i 
_ 
Tt 
_ 
mt +1 'Mt-i 
Yt Yt (1 + 7t)(1 +'Yt) Yt-i Yt Yt (1 + 7t)(1 +'Yt) Yt-i 
bt 1 bt_1 
Yt (1+7t)(1+7t)yt-i 
The right-hand side shows the net borrowing required to fund the deficit expressed as a 
proportion of GDP. 
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We also define the nominal primary deficit Ptdt (the total deficit less debt interest 
payments) as 
Ptd _ PtDt - RtBt-, 
which implies that 
dt Dt Rt bt-, 
Yt yt (l+rt)(1+'Yt)yt-i 
Hence the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP is 
dt 
= 
9tTt'nt+ 1 mt-i 
Yt Yt Yt Yt (1 + 7rt)(1 + ryt) yt-i 
bt 1+ Rt bt-, 
(3.65) 
Yt (l+7rt)(1+%t)yt-1 
This is a non-linear difference equation in y If we define 
1+Rt 
l+ pt = (1+7t)(1+'Yt) 
where approximately, pt = Rt - 7rt - -yt = rt - -yt, the real interest rate adjusted for 
economic growth, then equation (3.65) can be written as 
It 
= (1 + Pt) 
bt-, 
+ 
dt 
Yt Yt-i Yt 
(3.66) 
This is the key equation for determining the sustainability of fiscal policy. We note that the 
evolution of " can also be written in terms of the total deficit since Yt 
bt 1 bt_1 Dt 
_+- (3.67) 
yt (1 + 7rt)(1 + "Yt) yt-i yt 
For positive inflation and growth this is a stable difference equation. 
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3.3 Fiscal sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability concerns the evolution of yL and whether it remains finite or explodes. 
The fiscal stance is said to be sustainable if yt is finite and if financial markets are willing 
to hold the level of debt that emerges. Before describing our proposed new procedure 
for determining whether the fiscal stance is sustainable we review the principal methods 
available in the literature. All of these methods take equation (3.66) as their starting point. 
In discussing sustainability it is convenient to distinguish between two cases: where the 
discount rate pt (and hence Rt,, 7rt and ryt) is assumed to be constant and where it is allowed 
to be time varying. " 
3.3.1 Constant discount rate 
If pt is assumed to be constant then from equation (3.66) y evolves according to the differ- 
ence equation 
bt 
= (1 + p) 
bt-1 
+ 
dt 
(3.68) 
Yt Yt-i Yt 
where 1+p= (1+7)(R y) or, approximately, p=R- it - -y. 
The solution for yI depends 
on whether the equation (3.68) is stable or unstable. We consider both cases. 
Casel: p<0 (stable case) 
<1 and equation (3.68) is a stable difference equation, and In this case 5+00+1) 
hence can be solved backwards by successive substitution. The expected value of the debt- 
GDP ratio in n period's time conditional on information at time t is 
30 Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bohn (1995,2005) argue that the appropriate discount rate to use for 
discounting future primary surpluses is the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution. In a complete markets 
full general equilibrium model this would be the real rate of return used here. 
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Et(bt+n) + P) n 
bt 
+ 
n-1 
E (l + P) n-s Et(dt+s (3.69) Yt+n, Yt 
S=O Yt+s 
Taking the limit as n -* oo gives the transversality condition 
1rn (1 + P)nb t=0 (3.70) 
If this holds then we obtain 
n 
Jim Et (bt+n) = Jim 
E (1 + P) n-s Et (dt+s) (3.71) 
n-'O° Yt+n n-ýoo 
s=1 
Yt+s 
The evolution of the debt-GDP ratio depends on that of d' . Suppose that ' may be ye yr 
stochastic but is expected to grow at the rate A, then 
Et( 
dt+s) 
= (1 + ý)3 
dt 
(3.72) 
Yt+s Yt 
It follows that 
n 
lim Et(bt+n) - lim 
E (1 + p)n-s (1 ý' S 
dt 
n-' °° yt+n n-' °° Yt 
s=1 
(1 + A) n- (1 + P)n dt 
= 1im(1+A) 
-n-'°° A-P yt 
1 dt 
if A=0 (3.73) 
P Yt 
If p, A<0 then limnýý Et(bt+") =0 and it will explode if A>0. Thus, the debt-GDP yt+n 
ratio will remain finite and positive if the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP (- y`) does 
not explode. We note that if A<0 then yE is a stationary 1(0) process and the expected, 
or long-run value of the debt-GDP ratio is zero. And if A=0 then y is a non-stationary 
I(1) process, and hence y- will also be I(1). Moreover, y` and yL will be cointegrated with 
3.3 Fiscal sustainability 103 
cointegrating vector (1,1). Fiscal policy is therefore sustainable provided yE does not grow 
over time. 
Case 2: p>0 (unstable case) 
In this case 0< <1+i+(R ry) <1 and equation (3.68) is an unstable difference equation 
and hence must be solved forwards, not backwards as follows: 
bt 1 
Et ( 
bt+l 
- 
dt+l 
Yt 1+P Yt+i Yt+i 
n 
_ (1 + 0)-n Et 
t+n) 
-E (1 +, 0)-' Et( 
dt+s) 
(3.74) 
Yt+n 
s_1 
Yt+s 
Taking limits as n -* oo gives the transversality condition 
Ilr (1 + p)-n 
E( (3.75) 
n---, oo Yt+n 
which implies that 
0 bt 0 
_E (1 + p)_s Eta 
-dt+s) (3.76) 
Yt 
s=1 
Yt+s 
We note that the right-hand side of equation (3.76) is the expected present value of 
current and future primary surpluses expressed as a proportion of GDP. This condition 
implies that current and future surpluses will be sufficient to pay-off current debt. 
Suppose once more that yL is expected to evolve according to equation (3.72) then 
00 bt 
=E (l + p) (1 + A)s(-dt (3.77) 
Yt 
s=1 
Yt 
_ 
1+\ ( -dt fA 
P-A yt) 
i -1 <<p, P>0 
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Thus, provided that the current level of the debt-GDP ratio does not exceed the right-hand 
side, fiscal policy is sustainable and the debt-GDP ratio will grow at the rate A, the same 
rate as -dt Yt 
If yt is stationary then -1 <A<0 and yL will also be stationary. If A 
y 'L is l(l) then we obtain the same condition as equation (3.73) 
bt 
= 
1(-dt 
Yt P Yt 
implying that yr will be l(l) and cointegrated with yd' 
0, so that 
(3.78) 
These results can be compared with a number of well-known empirical tests for fiscal 
sustainability and provide some insight into the rationale behind the tests. The test of 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is based on the following version of equation (3.74) 
00 bt 
=Ao(1+P)-t-E(l+P)-sEt(dt+s) 
Yt 
s=1 
Yt+s 
except that real debt and the real primary deficit is used rather than bt and dt . 
On the null Yt Yt 
hypothesis that the transversality condition holds AO = 0. 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) propose a cointegration test for fiscal sustainability. They 
measure debt and the primary deficit in real terms rather than as proportions of GDP, but 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) employ the test expressing the variables as proportions of GDP. 
If the variables have unit roots and are cointegrated with cointegrating vector (p, 1) then 
fiscal policy is sustainable. (Or, if government expenditures and revenues are I(1), then the 
cointegrating vector with debt must be (p, 1, -1). ) This result follows immediately from 
equations (3.73) and (3.78). Alternatively, if the cointegrating relation between debt and 
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the primary deficit is 
dt bt 
-+a-=Ut Yt Yt 
where ut is 1(0), then from equation 3.68), 
(l + a) 
bt 
= (1 + P) 
bt-i 
+ ut 
Yt Yt-i 
It follows that yG has a unit root if cc = p. 
3.3.2 Time-varying discount rate 
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In practice, pt will be time-varying, not constant and so these tests will in general be invalid. 
We therefore revert to the original budget constraint, equation (3.66). This may be solved 
forwards to obtain 
n bt 
= Et [(rls 
1 bt+n 
_ Et[ý (ni_1 
1 dt+s 
(3.79) 
Yt I+ Pt+s Yt+n 
s_1 
1+ Pt+i Yt+s 
if 
btS=II. 
_ 
I 
<1 for alls>1 1+ Pt+i 
Hence fiscal solvency depends on the transversality condition 
lim Et [(IIS 11) 
bt+n 
]=0 (3.80) 
n-, oo 1+ Pt+s Yt+n 
which implies that 
bt 
= Et[>00 (IIz_1 11 
dt+s 
(3.81) ) (- )ý 
Yt 
S=i 
+ Pt+i Yt+s 
Like equation (3.76), equation (3.81) says that the present value of current and future pri- 
mary surpluses must be sufficient to offset current debt liabilities. The difference is that the 
discount rate is compounded from time-varying rates. 
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In order to analyse sustainability we define the variables 
bt 
Xt = 6t, n- 
Yt 
Zt = CSt, n, 
dt t 
Yt 
We may now write equation (3.66) as 
Axt = Zt 
Fiscal sustainability now requires the transversality condition 
lim Et(xt+n) =0 n-, oc 
and implies that 
n 
xt =- lim Et [E zt+s] n-+oo 
s=1 
Wilcox (1989) shows that fiscal sustainability is satisfied if xt is a zero-mean station- 
ary process. Wickens and Uctum (2000) prove a more general result that does not require Xt 
to be stationary. They show that fiscal sustainability is satisfied if zt is a zero-mean station- 
ary process. It then follows that xt will be an I(1) process. Trehan and Walsh (1991) argue 
that fiscal policy is sustainable with a variable discount rate if the total deficit is station- 
ary. This result follows directly from equation (3.67). As it is a stable difference equation 
if nominal growth is positive, y, is finite (and stationary) if D+s is stationary. 
3.3.3 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
This was based on the original Maastricht conditions that yi must be less than 0.6 and 
DL 
must be less than 0.03. It can be shown that these conditions are neither necessary, nor suf- 
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ficient for fiscal sustainability. Much has already written on the issue of necessity. To show 
insufficiency, consider equation (3.67) assuming that inflation and growth are constant and 
bt and Dt are constant at these maximum values. Hence we obtain the condition Yt Yt 
b_ (1+ßr)(1+ ;)D 
y (1+ßr)(1+7)-1 
1D 
7r+'Yy 
It follows, therefore, that 
D 
7r + 'y ^ý y b 
y 
Thus, given the limits on debt and deficits specified under the SGP, the nominal rate of 
growth must not be less than °s 5%. If nominal growth were less than this then 
debt would rise above 60% even if the deficit limit were satisfied. Conversely, even if the 
deficit or debt limits were exceeded, the appropriate rate of nominal growth would still be 
consistent with fiscal sustainability. For example, if the deficit exceeds 3% it is still possible 
for the debt-GDP ratio to satisfy the 60% limit if nominal growth exceeds 5%. This shows 
that, in general, the SGP is neither necessary nor sufficient for fiscal sustainability. 
3.4 An index of the fiscal stance 
All of these tests of fiscal sustainability are of limited practicality. The main problem is 
that the tests are based on the past behaviour of debts and deficits whereas the sustainabil- 
ity of current fiscal stance is related to their future behaviour. The test outcome could be 
dominated by an influential, but anomalous, period in the distant past yet the current fiscal 
stance may still be sustainable. Even if the current fiscal stance is not sustainable, govern- 
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ments could claim that a policy change planned for the future would make it sustainable. 
As a result, the tests provide an ineffective constraint on fiscal policy, especially in the near 
future. This suggests that we need a more forward-looking approach that focuses on the 
short-term implications of the current fiscal stance. As the fiscal position varies over time, 
it would be helpful to have a measure that reflects this and enables historical comparisons 
to be made. We therefore propose constructing an index number series of the current fiscal 
stance. 
The index is based on the inter-temporal government budget constraint. The index 
measures the ratio of the desired change in the discounted debt-GDP ratio over a given 
time horizon relative to the forecast change. The target debt-GDP ratio at the end of the 
horizon could be, for example, a particular number such as the 60% SGP limit, a percentage 
reduction or the maintenance of the current level of debt. The forecast change in the debt- 
GDP ratio is, in effect, the present value of current and future primary surpluses. Future 
primary surpluses and discount rates are forecast using a VAR based on the variables in 
the govermmment budget constraint. Any other forecasting model could be used instead, 
including a structural model of the whole economy. The reasons for choosing a such a 
VAR are its simplicity and its ease of replication and automation for any economy. We also 
wish to try to avoid taking a particular view on macroeconomic theory and on the structural 
of the economy. Since time variation in the future discount rate may be of importance, we 
base the VAR on our log-linear approximation to the government budegt constraint. The 
use of an index of sustainability was initially proposed by Blanchard et al. (1990) and 
Buiter et al. (1993). Their indices are based on a comparison of the current debt-GDP 
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ratio and that n periods ahead with given fixed values of the deficit and discount rate. The 
main shortcoming of these indices of fiscal sustainability is that the future dynamic of all 
macroeconomic variables employed to forecast fiscal policy is set in advance through ad- 
hoc assumptions rather than being determined endogenously from a model of the economy 
(see, Cuddington 1997). In contrast, the index of the fiscal stance proposed in this paper 
overcomes these issues and generalises the existing indices by allowing the deficit and 
discount rate to be time-varying and endogenous. 
3.4.1 Log-linearising the GBC 
The index of the fiscal stance proposed in this paper is based upon a log-linear approxima- 
tion to the government budget constraint. In principle, the log-linear approximation can be 
taken about several points. 
One option is the steady-state solution of the GBC, assuming it exists. The problem 
with the steady-state solution is that, even when it exists, it may be difficult to detect in 
small samples, not least because, even in small samples, government control over the level 
and the way of financing public spending implies that long run fiscal targets are unstable 
and bounded to change under different fiscal regimes. One could also argue that the exis- 
tence of the steady state already implies long run fiscal sustainability, hence there no need 
of further testing it or constructing an index of the fiscal stance. This is true to the extent 
that one is interested solely about the long run implications of fiscal policy. The index of 
the fiscal stance proposed in this paper aims at assessing the short and medium run effects 
of the current fiscal stance, given its long run position. In addition, it would be preferable 
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to have a measure of the fiscal stance which can always be computed, regardless of whether 
or not the steady state can be detected empirically. 
As a result, a second option would be to specify an intertemporal objective function 
for the government and then computing the optimal level of debt-GDP given the constraint 
of the economy. In this case, the GBC can be log-linearised about the average optimal level 
of debt computed from the solution to this optimisation problem. 
In this paper we follow a much simpler approach and log-linearise the GBC about a 
balanced-budget position, in which the constant debt-GDP ratio is chosen to be consistent 
with a specific level set by the government. In particular, we choose the sample average of 
the debt-GDP ratio. Alternatively, when the index is computed for European countries the 
obvious candidate is the 60 per cent ratio established in the SGP. We then take the sample 
average of both the government revenue-GDP ratio and the interest rate on government 
debt. Finally, the level of government spending is determined so that it is consistent with 
the balanced budget position and the average measures of debt, revenue and interest rate 
described above. 
In computing the index, as the primary deficit can take negative values, it is necessary 
to write the GBC in terms of total expenditures gt and total revenues vt both of which are 
strictly positive. We therefore re-write the GBC, equation (3.64), as 
bt 
- 
9t 
- 
vt + (1 + Pt)bt-i 
Yt Yt Vt 
where 
? it 
_ 
Tt nit 1 'Mt-i 
Yt Yt 
+ 
Yt (1 +7rt)(1 +7) yt-i 
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Next we approximate the GBC about the balanced-budget solution described above. 
As described above, we assume bt , vt and pt to be constant and equal to their sample Yt Yt 
average, which we denote with y, y and p respectively. The corresponding balanced budget 
level of I-, denoted as y, is determined from to the GBC therefore satisfies 
gvb 
yyy 
To log-linearise, the GBC may be re-written as 
f (xt) = exp [In 
bt 
]- exp [In 
9t ]+ exp [In 
v]- 
exp [In (1 + pt) + In 
bt-1 
]=0. 
Yt Yt Yt Yt-i 
Noting that a first-order Taylor series approximation to h(xt) = exp[ln xt] about In x is 
h(xt) = x[1 + (In xt - In x)] 
a log-linear approximation to the GBC is given by 
In 
bt 
c+9 In 
9t 
-V In 
v+ (1 + p) ln(1 + pt) + (1 + p)lnbt-1 (3.82) 
Yt b yt b yt Yt-i 
c= -plnb-91n9+vlnv-(1+p)ln(1+p). ybyby 
As ln(1+pt) ^- pt, in effect the discount rate is an additional variable in the equation. Thus, 
by employing a log-linear transformation of the GBC, we may analyse fiscal position when 
the deficit and discount rate are time-varying using, once more, a constant coefficient linear 
difference equation. 
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Whether the difference equation is a stable or unstable depends on the sign of p. 
Assuming that p>0, we solve the equation forwards to obtain 
n 
In 
bt 
= (1 + p)-n Et(In 
bt+n) 
_E (1 + p)-3 Et(kt+s) (3.83) Yt yt+n 
s=1 
v kt = c+ - In 
9t 
-v- In 
t+ (1 + p) In(1 + pt) (3.84) b Yt b Yt 
where kt is, in effect, the logarithmic equivalent of the primary deficit. The transversality 
condition is therefore 
lim (1 + p) -n Et (1n 
bt+n) 
=0 (3.85) l-' °° Yt+n 
which implies that 
00 
In 
bt 
=- (1 + p)-' Et(kt+s). (3.86) 
yi 
s=1 
If kt is stationary then In b' , and hence 
bt 
, remains finite and stationary. This may Yt Yt 
occur due to the individual terms of kt being stationary, or due to some being l(l) but 
being cointegrated with the appropriate cointegrating vector. If kt and each component of 
kt are I(1) then, if they also cointegrated with cointegrating vector given by the coefficients 
in the definition of c, then fiscal sustainability is still satisfied. From equation (3.82) the 
cointegrating vector is: 
Inbt --- 
1n9t+ 1n-+l+Pln(1+Pt) 
Yt p pb Yt pb yt p 
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3.4.2 Constructing the index 
The basis of our proposed index is the inter-temporal log-linearized budget constraint equa- 
tion (3.82). This can be re-written as: 
n 
(I + p)-n Fit(ln 
bt+n) 
_ In 
bt 
=E (1 + P)-' Et(kt+s) Yt+n Vt 
3=1 
which can be interpreted as determining in logarithmic terms the present value of primary 
deficits required to achieve an expected change in discounted debt. If we replace Et [in y'+7L ] 
by a target level ln('-+ )* then we can determine whether future values of lit are consistent Yt+n 
with satisfying a particular target change in discounted debt given by: 
(1 + p)-' In( 
bt+n)* 
- In 
bt 
Yt+n Yt 
_ (1 + p)-' Et(kt+s) 
s=1 
(3.87) 
The left-hand side of equation (3.87) can be interpreted as the desired change in dis- 
counted debt between periods t and t+n. The right-hand side is the logarithmic equivalent 
of the present value of the primary surpluses required to achieve this desired change in 
discounted debt. We replace Et(kt+s) by forecasts of the future values of kt based on the 
information available at time t, including the current fiscal stance. 
A measure of whether the current fiscal stance is likely to achieve the debt objective 
is obtained by comparing the two sides of equation (3.87). If, for example, the aim is to 
decrease discounted debt then the left-hand side will be negative and the right-hand side 
gives the present value of the primary surplus required to achieve this reduction in debt. We 
therefore base our measure of the consistency of the current fiscal stance with the n-period 
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debt objective on the gap between the objective and the forecast outcome: 
FS(t, n) = [(1 + p)-n ln(bt+n )* - In 
bt 
1-nE (1 + p)-s Et(kt+s) > 0. 
Yt+n Yt 
S-i 
Our index is: 
FSI(t, n) = exp[FS(t, n)] 
Kt, 
n 
bt/yt 
n 
In Kt, n = (I + P)-n In( 
bt+n 
)* -E (1 + P)-S Et(kt+s) Yt+n 
s=1 
lit = c+9In9t - 
vIn-+(1+p)In(1+pt) 
b Yt b Yt 
c= -pln 
b--g 
In g -+ 
V In v -- (1 + p)ln(l + p). ybyby 
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As n -* oo the first term in In kt, n tends to zero and the index can be interpreted as com- 
paring the existing level of the debt-GDP ratio, with the resources to pay it off. The index 
may be interpreted as follows: 
(i) FSI(n) =1 the debt-GDP ratio in period t+n is forecast to be on target 
(ii) FSI(n) >1 the debt-GDP ratio in period t+n is forecast to be below target 
(ii) FSI (n) <1 the debt-GDP ratio in period t+n is forecast to be above target 
Only in case (iii) is the forecasted present value of the primary surplus insufficient to 
achieve the desired change in the debt-GDP ratio. In this sense, the current fiscal stance 
would not be sustainable. 
In practice, the special case considered by Buiter and Blanchard of maintaining a 
constant debt-GDP ratio over the planning horizon will usually be of most interest. In this 
3.4 An index of the fiscal stance 115 
case 
n 
FS(t, n) _ [(1+p)-n- 1] In 
bt 
-E(1+p)-3Et(kt+s) >0 Yt 
s_1 
The index then becomes 
FSI(t, n) = exp[FS(t, n)] 
_ 
Kt, 
n 
bt/yt (3.88) 
n 
In Kt, n = (1 + p)-n In 
bt-E 
(1 + p)-' Et Yt 
s=1 
Since in this case: 
n 
In 
bt 
= (l + p)-n In 
bt 
- (1 + p)-' Et( t+, ) Yt Yt 
s_1 
1n 
n 
(1 + P)-3 Et(kt+s) 
1- (l + p) s-1 
1n 
n (1 + P) Et(kt+s) P 
s=1 
the index could also be calculated as 
FSI (t, n) = t, n (3.89) bt/yt 
1n 
In Kt 
n=- _n 
Z (1 + p) Et(kt+s) 
1-(l+p) 
s=1 
where the numerator is now proportional to the present value of primary surpluses. We 
consider this case in our empirical examples below. 
3.4.3 Forecasting the fiscal variables 
In order to compute the index, we require forecasts of the variables of the following vector 
zt: 
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Zt 
bt 9t Vt IRL IRS = -ý -ý -ý ytý tý tý t Yt Yt Yt 
where yt , 
yL and yt denote government debt, revenue and net spending, respectively, all 
measured as a proportion to GDP; yt is the output gap measured as deviation of real GDP 
from a quadratic trend; art is the inflation rate computed from the growth rate of the GDP 
deflator; I RLt is the long-term interest rate; and I RSt is the short term interest rate. 
For the reasons given above, we use a VAR(p) to obtain these forecasts. This is a 
simple forecasting scheme that is easily implemented and is theory free. We denote the 
VAR by: 
P 
zt = Ao + Aizt-i + et, (3.90) 
2-1 
where et - i. i. d. [0, E]. The vector of variables zt may be 1(0) or I(1). For forecasting 
purposes it is unnecessary to take account any non-stationarity or cointegration among the 
variables. Equally, if cointegration exists, a cointegrated VAR could be estimated instead 
of a levels VAR and the cointegrated VAR could then be written in levels to obtain (3.90). 
We also note that to improve the forecasts zt may contain additional variables to those that 
appear in the budget constraint. 
n-period ahead forecasts may be obtained using the companion form 
Zt = Bo + BZt_1 + ut. 
where Z' -[z' z' z ], u' = [e' 0 0] B' = [A', 0, ..., 0] and t- t' t-1 "', t-p+l t- t> 3 ""., 
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Al A2 
.. Ap-, 0I0. 
B= 0I0 
010 
The forecast of Zt+, is 
s-1 
Et [Zt+sj =Z BZBO + B8Zt 
i=0 
Expressing lit as the following linear function of zt 
kt =a+ ß'Zt 
and defining the selection matrix S =[I, 0,0,.., 0] such that 
zt= SZt 
we obtain 
FS(t, n) = In Kt, n-In 
bt 
Yt 
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1n s-1 bt 
-n 
E{(1 + p) -s [a + 3'S (E BZBo + BsZt)]} - In 
As the last term In y is also a linear function of Zt, FS(t, n) could just be written as 
FS(t, n) = an + bnZt 
where a,, is a scalar dependent on the time horizon and b, is a vector. This emphasizes 
that FS(t, n) is based on information available at time t, and in particular the current fiscal 
stance. Increasing the forecast horizon alters a, z and b, but not Zt. 
To implement this in practice it will be necessary to estimate a,, and b, from the VAR 
estimates. The choice of p and c could be based, for example, on the average values in the 
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sample, their time t values or their average values over the forecast period. A time series for 
FS(t, n) could be calculated from the sample either using all of the sample observations to 
estimate the VAR, or recursively using only observations up to period t. 
Note that for the empirical computation of the index, no measure of pt is included in 
the VAR. This is because we take only the n-periods ahead forecast of bý 9' and LI and then yt yt yt 
compute the corresponding value for pt in such a way that the one-period GBC is satisfied 
in its forecasts. This implies that one can construct the index of the fiscal stance also by 
comparing the debt-GDP ratio forecasted n-periods ahead with the corresponding targeted 
level, rather than constructing the right-hand side of the GBC as described above. We do 
not follow this alternative approach because in this case the index cannot be decomposed, 
hence it would not be possible to understand the reasons of the misalignment between the 
forecasted debt and the its targeted level. 
3.5 Indices of the fiscal stance of the US, the UK and Germany 
We now construct a time series of the index of the fiscal stance for the US, the UK and 
Germany. For the US we consider three horizons: one-year, two-years and five-years ahead. 
For the UK and Germany we use just a one-year horizon. We assume that the aim in each 
period is to maintain the current level of the debt-GDP ratio. Hence, we use the version 
of the index given by equation (3.89). The data are annual and range from 1960 to 2005 
for the US, from 1970 to 2005 for the UK, and from 1977 to 2009 for Germany. The 
data sources and the construction of the variables are described in the Appendix. There 
are minor differences in definitions for the different countries. For example, the debt data 
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for the US are measured as net liabilities. This is different from the Maastricht definition 
of debt but, given the definitions of the other variables, is consistent with the government 
budget constraint. Table 3.1 gives the average values for v, b, g, b and p in Germany, the 
UK and the US. 
Table 3.1: Balanced-budget GBC (in percentage) 
b9VP 
Germany 48 89 43.17 44.13 1.96 
United Kingdom 35.22 40.74 41.64 2.57 
United States 43.81 28.86 31.24 5.44 
Note: b, v and p are sample averages, g is constructed from balanced budget equation 
v=g+ pb 
3.5.1 The United States 
Figure 3.1 gives a plot of eight key variables: the debt-GDP ratio (Debt-GDP), the gov- 
ernment spending in goods and services as a proportion of GDP (Spending-GDP), the gov- 
ernment revenue as a proportion of GDP (Revenue-GDP), the implied primary deficit-GDP 
ratio (Deficit-GDP), the inflation rate computed from the change in the GDP deflator (Infla- 
tion), the deviation of real GDP from a quadratic trend (output gap), the long term interest 
rate (IRL) and the short term interest rate (IRS). 
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Figure 3.1: US data plot 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for these variables using up to 6 lags suggest that we 
cannot reject a unit root for any variable other than the output gap. As we are using the VAR 
only for forecasting we estimate a VAR in levels of the variables and ignore any possible 
cointegration arising from the variables that have unit roots. For space reasons we do not 
report the results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the VAR estimates, but we note 
that a lag of 1 produces serially uncorrelated residuals. 
We examine fiscal sustainability based a constant target debt-GDP ratio for three 
horizons: one-year, two-years and five-years ahead. For each horizon we present four 
figures. Figures 3.2.1,3.2.2 and 3.2.5 are plots of FSI(n), the index of the fiscal stance. 
We recall that FSI(n) <I implies that the debt-GDP ratio is forecast to be above target. 
The forecasts are based on estimates of the VAR for the whole sample. 
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Figures 3.3-3.5 give various breakdowns of the index into its component parts. Thus, 
Figures 3.3.1,3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are plots of 1nk, -- and the forecast logarithm of the present Yt 
value of current and future primary surpluses, In Kt,,, which we denote in the graph by 
EPVGBC(n). There are three components to FS(t, n): the desired change in discounted 
debt PVdb(n), the present value of the primary surplus PVs(n) and the term for the dis- 
count factor, PVrho(n). These are plotted in Figures 3.4.1,3.4.2 and 3.4.5. Finally, in 
Figures 3.5.1,3.5.2 and 3.5.5 we plot the two components of PVs(n). These are the 
present value of revenues PVv(n) and of expenditures PVg(n). 
(i) One-year horizon 
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Figure 3.5.1 
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(ii) Two year horizon 
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Figure 3.3.2 
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Figure 3.5.2 
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(iii) Five-year horizon 
Figure 3.2.5 
United States: Fiscal Stance Index 
2T 
FSK5) 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
r% A 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
3.5 Indices of the fiscal stance of the US, the UK and Germany 
Figure 3.3.5 
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Figure 3.5.5 
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We observe that FSI(n), the index of the fiscal stance, exceeds unity for any length of 
time only during the early 1960's and the 1990's. In the other periods it is either roughly 
equal to unity (implying that the -fiscal stance is compatible with a non-rising debt-GDP 
ratio) or less than unity (implying that the debt-GDP ratio is rising). 
From 2001 the FSI strongly indicates a rising level of the debt-GDP ratio at each 
horizon. The FSI is also less than unity for the period ending in 1989. The start date of 
this period depends on the time horizon. For one-year and two-year horizons it is similar, 
consisting of most of the 1980's, but for the five-year horizon it extends back through the 
1970's, almost to 1965. Thus the 1990's marked a period of US fiscal recovery which 
ended in around 2000. 
Decomposing the index into its components, we find that FSI< I for the period 1979- 
1994 when the debt-GDP ratio rose substantially. We also find that variations in the present 
value of forecast primary surpluses are the main determinant of fluctuations in the index. 
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The change in debt target and the discount factor nearly offset each other. This is because 
we have assumed a constant discounted debt target and so the discount factor is the variable 
causing the change in discounted debt term to fluctuate. The present values for expenditures 
and revenues are similar before 1995 but are different thereafter. In the period 1995-2001 
the present value of revenues exceed those of expenditures thereby producing a fiscal re- 
covery. After 2001 the present value of expenditures exceed those of revenues. This fiscal 
deterioration was due to a combination of rising expenditures and sharply falling revenues. 
Fluctuations in the discount rate make an additional, but not large, contribution. To sum- 
marize, there is clear evidence of a break in US fiscal policy from 2001 that has resulted 
in a rising debt-GDP ratio no matter the horizon over which we look. This fiscal stance 
would be unsustainable if maintained. The cause is a combination of a rising present value 
of expenditures and of sharply falling revenues. There have been previous periods when 
the fiscal stance also led to a rising debt-GDP ratio, most notably from 1979-1994. This 
was not fully corrected until the period 1995-2000 when the present value of expenditures 
was reduced and was much lower than that of revenues. 
3.5.2 The United Kingdom 
The data are annual for the period 1970 to 2005 and are plotted in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6: UK data 
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Based once again on a levels VAR(l), but considering only a one-year horizon, we 
obtain the measures of the index reported in Figures 3.7-3.10. 
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We observe only two brief periods where FSI > 1. These are 1986-1988 and 1997- 
2000. From 1971-1984 and after 2000 FSI <I often by a considerable margin. The period 
1984-2005 has four clear episodes. From 1984-1989 there were falls in the debt-GDP ra- 
tio and in both revenues and expenditures in present value terms resulting in an improving 
fiscal position. This was a period where privatization receipts were used to pay off debt, 
even though the assets were not included in our measure of debt, namely, net government 
liabilities. From 1989-1992, when sterling left the ERM, the fiscal position deteriorated 
sharply due to rising expenditures. This may even have been a contributory factor in the 
speculation against sterling in 1992. After 1992 the debt-GDP rose steadily as it did iti the 
US, but expenditures, after continuing to rise, turned down, which caused an improvement 
in the fiscal stance. From 1996-2001 there was a marked improvement in the fiscal posi- 
tion mainly due to rising revenues from the upturn in economic activity. From 2001 the 
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fiscal stance deteriorated again due to expenditures (which started to increase in 1998) ris- 
ing much more than revenues. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has said throughout his 
tenure that the UK is meeting its fiscal targets, but this evidence indicates that this has not 
precluded an obvious decline in the sustainability of the UK's fiscal stance. 
3.5.3 Germany 
The data are annual for the period 1960 to 2005 and are plotted in Figure 3.11. 
Figure 3.11: Germany data 
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The results on fiscal sustainability for the period from 1977 are reported in Figures 
3.12-3.15 for a one-year horizon. 
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There has been a steady deterioration in the F SI over the whole period since 1977. 
There were two occasions when the index worsened sharply. They are in 1989 on German 
unification, and again in 1999 shortly after EMU began. Both events seem to have been 
very harmful to the -fiscal stance. Throughout the period the debt-GDP ratio has risen and, 
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with the exception of the period 1992-1999, the fiscal position has gradually deteriorated. 
The improvement during the period 1992-1999 coincides with improvements in the US 
and UK and is due to sustained economic growth causing a rise in tax revenues. But since 
expenditures also increased during this period, the improvement in the German fiscal stance 
was less marked that for those of the US and UK. Since 1999 the fiscal stance has continued 
to worsen as expenditures, although falling over the period, have exceeded revenues which 
have also decreased. The observed secular decline in the German fiscal stance reflects and 
supports the widespread perception that Germany may need structural reform. 
3.6 Using the fiscal stance index for policy analysis 
The index of the fiscal stance proposed in this paper gives a useful benchmark against 
which to compare the short term implications of the current -fiscal policy. In this section 
we use a bootstrapping technique to add confidence bands to the index in order to measure 
the statistical significance of its policy prescriptions. In principle, since the index is based 
upon VAR forecasts, one could bootstrap the VAR forecasts and then compute at each 
stage of the iteration the FSL There are at least two problems with this approach. First, 
there is not agreement in the literature on how to bootstrap VAR forecasts, in particular 
when the VAR may include nonstationary variables (see, for a review, Berkowitz and Kilian 
(2000)). The second issue is that much of the literature on bootstrapping the predictions 
arising from AR(p) and VAR(p) models focuses on out-of-sample forecasts, whereas the 
index is computed by taking forecasts through the whole sample period. This is an issue 
particularly relevant because the bootstrap of out-of-sample AR(p) and VAR(p) forecasts 
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is generally accomplished by setting the last p observations in each bootstrapping sample 
equal to the last p observations in the original sample. In this way the bootstrapped forecasts 
are always constructed by using the same type of information in each bootstrap sample. 
(See, Thombs and Schucany (1990)). The FSI exploits in-sample forecasts from the VAR, 
so that predictions are based on an information set that changes with the sample. In this 
case, a possible solution is to estimate the VAR recursively and then compute and bootstrap 
the FSI at each point in the sample. This would be however be inconsistent with the way 
in which we compute the FSI in the paper, as we estimate the VAR only once and over 
the whole sample. In light of these issues we follow a much straightforward approach. 
We recognise that the FSI is ultimately a time series which can be approximated with an 
AR(p) model. Hence, the estimated parameters of any AR(p) model can be bootstrapped 
following the standard Stine (1987) algorithm. This works as follows: 
I. Set up the AR(p) model: A (L) yt = et 
2. Estimate the parameters A (L) and compute the vector of residuals 6t. 
-P 3. Compute rescaled residuals ^ct ýt/ 
=ý 
V T-2p 
4. Resample with replacement from the rescaled residuals ýt to generate the bootstrap 
innovations ý* t 
5. Generate a bootstrap sample ýy*j from the original sample jytj leaving the first t 
p-observations in fy*1 equal to those in fyt I t 
6. Generate pseudo-data from A (L) yt = Et 
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7. 
8 
Calculate the bootstrap parameter estimates A* (L). P 
Compute the predicted series f ýt*+h I from ýt* =A (L) yt*. 
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9. Repeat 4-8 B-times and build the confidence interval. 
In particular, we used an AR(6) and constructed 10000 bootstrapped samples. Fig- 
ures 3.16-3.18 plot the FSI(I) for the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany 
with the corresponding 10 per cent confidence bands. 
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The results show that there are several periods in which the FSI index is either above 
or below I and well between the 10 per cent confidence bands. In particular, in the 
United 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
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States the index is below I and within the confidence bands during the first half of the 
1980's and the period 2003-2005. The index is above I throughout the 1990's and for short 
periods of time in the late 1960's, as well as mid and late 1970's. In the United Kingdom, 
the index is considerably greater than one only during the second half of the 1990's and 
early 2000. The index is significantly below I during the first half of the 1990's and after 
2001. The results for Germany display a significant deterioration after the 1990 and the 
year 2001, but also a significant recovery since 2005. 
We conclude by showing a further use of the index of the fiscal stance FSI to assess 
the likely implications that the current fiscal stance has over the future. As proposed in the 
previous section we fit an AR(p) model on the FSI series computed for each country. Next 
we take the n-periods ahead prediction of the index to evaluate its dynamic over the short 
run. The forecasts are displayed in figures 3.19,3.20 and 3.21, for the Unites States, the 
United Kingdom and Germany respectively. As well as the predicted path, each graph also 
plots the forecasts standard error, determined by taking into account both the error variance 
and parameter uncertainty. 
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Figure 3.19: US forecast FSI(I) 
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Figure 3.20: UK forecast FSI(I) 
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Figure 3.21: Germany forecast FSI(I) 
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In particular, the results show that the fiscal stance is forecasted to remain above I in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, and to deteriorate below I in GermanY. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed the construction of an index to measure the current fiscal 
stance. We have distinguished this from existing measures of the sustainability of the fiscal 
stance and argued that such tests, which focus on the past, may not be a helpful guide 
to the current stance of fiscal policy. Like the tests for fiscal sustainability, this index is 
based on the government inter-temporal budget constraint. The main differences are that 
the index is forward looking, it applies to a finite time horizon, and it uses a log-linear 
approximation to the government budget constraint which enables the inflation, economic 
growth and interest rates to be time varying rather than constant. In effect, the index is 
L 5-step Formwts FSI(F) 
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based on a comparison of the forecast and the desired debt-GDP ratio over that horizon 
where the forecast is constrained to satisfy the government budget constraint. We propose 
the use of a VAR forecasting model based on the government budget constraint as this 
is simple to compute and easily automated. We have shown how to identify individual 
components of the index that may be causing problems for the fiscal stance. We have 
applied this methodology to three countries: the US, the UK and Germany. In the UK 
and US the index of fiscal sustainability has fluctuated considerably with periods when 
the debt-GDP ratio has risen followed by periods when it has fallen. During the period of 
strong economic growth in the 1990's the fiscal positions of all three countries improved 
considerably, but in recent years the fiscal stance in all three countries has been steadily 
deteriorating. Our index indicates that a continuation of the present fiscal stances is leading 
to a period of marginal -fiscal recovery in the US and in the UK, while the Gernian fiscal 
position is expected to deteriorate over the medium run. 
Appendix A 
State space representation (Chapter 2) 
The dynamic constraint computed under the standard approach corresponds to the 
state vector of the reduced form VAR in equation (2.46) and has the same dynamic structure 
of the constraint in equation (2.54). The term A12 (L) Z2, t in equation (2.46) can be written 
as: 
pp 
A12 (L) Z2t Al2iL'Z2t= A12. IZ2t-I+Y: Al2iL'Z2t-1 = 
[Al2.1+ A- 12 (L)] Z2t-15 
i=2 
where A12.1 are the coefficients of the first lagOf Z2t while -ý-12 (L) includes the coefficients 
of all others lags. 
Therefore, under the standard approach the state space representation of the dynamic 
constraint is obtained by setting: 
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On the other hand, the dynamic constraint under the PVAR approach in equation (2.48) is 
compatible with a dynamic constraint of equation (2.58). Thus, the appropriate state space 
representation of the model under the PVAR approach is given by: 
Zl, t 
Zi, t-i 
Yt =I 
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Appendix B 
Tables and figures (Chapter 2) 
Table 2.1: Alternative specifications of the objective function 
Policy Weights 
-OF 
A, AY AArs 
I 11 0.5 
2 1 0.2 0.5 
3 15 0.5 
4 11 1 
5 11 0.1 
Notes: OF=Objective function, the OF is 
described in equation (2.6 1) 
Table 2.2: Interest rate rules under alternative specifications of the objective function, 
summary statistics 
Sample 1960-2006 1960- 1983 1984-2006 
SD AAD SD AAD SD AAD 
Original VAR 
2.80 2.76 2.30 
OF PVAR approach 
1 2.22 1.62 1.00 2.31 2.02 0.97 
2 2.17 1.33 1.17 1.78 1.78 0.90 
3 2.65 2.29 1.80 3.40 2.50 1.24 
4 2.18 1.29 1.24 1.77 2.01 0.83 
5 2.70 2.43 1.84 3.50 2.18 1.41 
Mean 2.38 1.79 1.41 2.55 1.10 1.07 
OF Standard approach 
1 3.03 1.31 2.29 1.44 2.28 1.17 
2 3.14 1.25 2.46 1.31 2.19 1.19 
3 2.95 1.55 2.10 1.78 2.49 1.31 
4 2.89 1.13 2.27 1.21 2.19 1.04 
5 3.27 1.59 2.41 1.79 2.44 1.40 
Mean 3.06 1.36 2.31 1.51 2.32 1.22 
Notes: OFs=Objective functions as described in table 1; SD= 
Standard Deviation, in percentage; AD= Average Absolute 
Distance between optimal and VAR rule, in percentage; 
mean=average value across die five OFs. 
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Table 2.3: Welfare loss analysis under alternative specifications of the objective function, 
undiscounted forecasts 
SD 
y 7r Ars Tot I y 7r Ars Tot 
_ Original VAR 
1.27 1.35 0.42 3.04 
OF PVAR approach 
unweighted weighted 
1 0.60 0.52 0.56 1.69 0.60 0.52 0.28 1.41 
2 0.75 0.52 0.56 1.74 0.15 0.63 0.18 0.96 
3 0.46 0.45 0.85 1.76 2.31 0.45 0.43 3.19 
4 0.67 0.54 0.45 1.66 0.67 0.54 0.45 1.66 
5 0.52 0.54 0.80 1.86 1.02 0.98 0.24 2.24 
OF Standard approach 
unweighted weighted 
1 1.02 0.98 0.48 2.48 1.02 0.98 0.24 2.24 
2 1.09 1.05 0.56 2.71 0.22 1.05 0.28 1.55 
3 0.88 0.87 0.34 2.09 4.41 0.87 0.17 5.45 
4 0.97 0.98 0.40 2.36 0.97 0.98 0.40 2.36 
5 1.10 0.98 0.62 2.70 1.10 0.98 0.06 2.14 
Notesi OF=Objective functions as described in table 1; 
SD=Standard Deviation, in percentage. 
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Table 2.4: Welfare loss analysis under alternative specifications of the objective function, 
discounted forecasts 
SD 
y 7r Ars Tot I y 7r Ars Tot 
Original VAR 
1.01 0.50 0.36 1.87 
OF PVAR approach 
unweighted weighted 
1 0.52 0.18 0.44 1.14 0.52 0.18 0.22 0.92 
2 0.62 0.14 0.27 1.03 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.40 
3 0.43 0.29 0.69 1.41 2.14 0.29 0.34 2.77 
4 0.57 0.16 0.34 1.07 0.57 0.16 0.34 1.07 
5 0.46 0.23 0.66 1.34 0.46 0.23 0.07 0.75 
OF Standard approach 
unweighted weighted 
1 0.84 0.43 0.43 1.70 0.84 0.43 0.22 1.49 
2 0.88 0.48 0.50 1.86 0.18 0.48 0.25 0.91 
3 0.76 0.45 0.29 1.50 3.82 0.45 0.14 4.42 
4 0.79 0.41 0.35 1.55 0.79 0.41 0.35 1.55 
5 0.93 0.47 0.56 1.95 0.93 0.47 0.06 1.45 
Notes: OF=Objective functions as described in table 1; 
SD=Standard Deviation, in percentage. 
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Table 2.5: Welfare loss computed from PVAR and standard approach under alternative 
choices of Ay and A, summary statistics 
PVAR Standard approach 
Loss AyA, Loss AY A, 
/\A7.8 = 
0.1 
min 1.86 1.14 0.88 2.15 2.56 0.39 
max 2.02 10 0.10 3.58 0.10 10 
mean 1.94 2.64 
SD 5.42 34.99 
0.5 
min 1.65 1.98 0.51 1.88 3.87 0.26 
max 1.84 10 0.1 3.40 0.1 10 
mean 1.74 2.10 
SD 6.05 27.84 
min 1.58 2.57 0.39 1.75 4.92 0.20 
max 1.80 0.1 10 3.25 0.1 10 
mean 1.65 1.92 
SD 5.26 28.16 
Notes: SD=Standard Deviation, in percentage; Ay ranges 
from 0.1 to 10, A 7r =1/ 
Ay' 
Appendix B Tables and figures (Chapter 2) 150 
Table 2.6: Output/inflation trade-off under PVAR and standard approach, summary 
statistics 
PVAR Standard approach 
From to From to 
AA, -, = 0.1 AY 10 3.77 10 2.59 
0.1 0.27 0.1 0.39 
SD(y) 0.417 0.425 0.75 0.88 
SD (ir) 0.471 0.462 1.21 0.90 
NWG -0. 001 -0.18 
AA,, = 0.5 
AY 10 3.59 10 4.17 
A, 0.1 0.28 0.1 0.24 
SD(y) 0.426 0.460 0.732 0.763 
SD (7r) 0.435 0.411 0.877 0.782 
NWG 0.01 -0.064 
, 
\AT'S 
ý 
1 
AY 10 4.32 10 5.20 
A, 0.1 0.23 0.1 0.19 
SD(y) 0.440 0.483 0.713 0.723 
SD(7r) 0.410 0.389 0.763 0.718 
NWG 0.022 -0.035 
Notes: SD=Standard Deviation, in percentage; A, = 1 /Ay; 
NWG= Net Welfare Gam=ASD(y) - ASD(7r) . 
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Figure 2.1: Data plot 
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Figure 2.2: Interest rate rules from original VAR, PVAR and standard approach, under 
alternative specification of the objective function 
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Figure 2.3. a: Output and inflation forecasts from original VAR, PVAR and standard 
approach, objective function 1,2 and3 
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Figure 2.3. b: Output and inflation forecasts from original VAR, PVAR and standard 
approach, objective function 4 and 5 
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Figure 2A Change in standard deviation of welfare loss components under alternative 
choices of Ay and A, PVAR approach 
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Figure 2.5: Change in standard deviation of welfare loss components under alternative 
choices of Ay and A, standard approach 
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Figure 2.6: Change in welfare loss under alternative choices of A, and A, PVAR and 
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Appendix C 
Data (Chapter 3) 
The US data are annual for the period 1960 to 2005 and are taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook database and are described in the OECD Economic Outlook Database 
Inventory and on the Annex Tables session of the Sources and Methods. 
GDP,, Value, at market prices, of gross domestic product; 
GNFL, Value of government net financial liabilities"; 
PGDP, deflator of GDP at market prices; 
GGINTP,, Value of gross government interest payments; 
GGINTR, Value of gross government interest receipts; 
GNINTP, Value of net government interest paymentS32. 
YPGT, Value of government total disbursement; 
YRGT, Value of government total receipts; 
IRS, Short-term nominal interest rate (in percentages)", 
IRL, Long-term interest rate (in percentages)" 
The variables used in this study are then calculated as follows: 
I. kl-, is GNFL in percentage of GDP. Yt 
31 This variable refers to the consolidated gross financial liabilities of the government sector net of short-term 
financial assets, such as cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector etc. 
32 GGINTP = GNINTP - GNINTR 
" U. S. rates refer to interest rates on United States dollar three-month deposits in London, UK interest rates 
are 3-month rates on interbank loans, while Gennany interest rates refer to the 3-month FIBOR rate. 
34 Rates refer to the ten-year government bond yield for the US and the UK, while they refer to the federal 
bond yield in the case of Germany. 
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2. Ll- is YRGT in percentage of GDP. Yt 
3. ýL' is YPGT minus GGINTP in percentage of GDP. Yt 
4.7rt is the annual rate of change in the natural logarithm of PGDP 
156 
5. yt is the output GAP measured as deviation of real GDP from a quadratic trend. 
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